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1. Introduction
Ordinary	 discourse	 is	 filled	 with	 discussions	 about	 “sexual	 orienta-
tion”.	Everyone	seems	to	have	opinions	about	it	—	whether	it	should	
be	a	legally	protected	class,	whether	it	is	apt	for	moral	judgment,	and	
whether	Lady	Gaga	is	right	that,	whatever	our	sexual	orientations,	we	
were	“born	this	way”.1 
This	discourse	suggests	a	common	understanding	of	what	“sexual	
orientation”	is.	But	even	a	cursory	search	turns	up	vastly	differing,	con-
flicting,	and	sometimes	ethically	troubling	characterizations	of	sexual	
orientation.	Consider	 the	 following,	 taken	 from	(respectively)	a	pro-
fessional	 scientific	 association,	 an	 LGBTQ	advocacy	 organization,	 a	
neuroscientist,	and	a	philosopher:
1. Sexual	orientation	refers	to	an	enduring	pattern	of	emo-
tional,	romantic,	and/or	sexual	attractions	to	men,	wom-
en,	or	both	sexes.2
2. ‘Sexual	orientation’	is	the	preferred	term	used	when	re-
ferring	 to	an	 individual’s	physical	and/or	emotional	at-
traction	to	the	same	and/or	opposite	gender.3 
3. Sexual	orientation	…	is	the	trait	that	predisposes	us	to	
experience	sexual	attraction	to	people	of	 the	same	sex	
as	ourselves	(homosexual,	gay,	or	lesbian),	to	persons	of	
the	other	sex	(heterosexual	or	straight),	or	to	both	sexes	
(bisexual).4
4. A	person’s	sexual	orientation	is	based	on	his	or	her	sex-
ual	desires	and	fantasies	and	the	sexual	behaviors	he	or	
she	is	disposed	to	engage	in	under	ideal	conditions.5
1.	 Lady	Gaga	(2011).	“Born	This	Way”.	Born This Way.	Abbey	Road	Studios.
2.	 The	American	Psychological	Association	(2008).
3.	 Human	Rights	Campaign	(2014).
4.	 LeVay	(2011),	1.
5.	 Stein	(1999),	45.
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The	 conceptual	 jumble	 surrounding	 sexual	 orientation	 suggests	
that	 the	 topic	 is	 overripe	 for	 analytical	 philosophical	 exploration.9 
While	 the	delay	 in	 such	 exploration	may	be	due	 to	metaphysicians’	
historical	focus	on	discovering	and	articulating	metaphysically	neces-
sary	truths	about	reality,	recent	feminist	critiques	have	brought	topics	
related	 to	contingent	social	 realities	 into	 the	subfield’s	 focus.	Philos-
ophers	 such	 as	Charlotte	Witt	 and	 Sally	Haslanger	 have	begun,	 for	
example,	rich	and	growing	literatures	on	metaphysical	questions	con-
cerning	gender	and	race.	But	sexual	orientation	has	yet	to	receive	due	
in-depth	metaphysical	exploration.	
This	paper	lays	the	groundwork	for	one	such	in-depth	exploration	
and,	in	so	doing,	encourages	further	analytic	philosophical	discussion	
of	 sexual	 orientation.	 Its	 target	 is	 twofold:	 (i)	 the	 everyday	 concept	
of	sexual	orientation,	and	(ii)	the	corresponding	concepts	associated	
with	 the	 taxonomy	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 (e. g.,	 gay,	 straight).	 These	
concepts	are	highly	 interwoven,	since	 the	concept	of	sexual	orienta-
tion	constrains	the	taxonomy.	(For	example,	a	concept	of	sexual	orien-
tation	that	centrally	concerns	a	relation	between	a	subject’s	own	sex	
[or	gender]	and	the	sex	[or	gender]	of	the	persons	they	are	attracted	
to	will	 imply	a	 taxonomy	containing	correspondingly	 relational	con-
cepts.)	My	project	sets	out	to	engineer	a	revised	concept	of	sexual	ori-
entation	that	implies	a	new	taxonomical	schema	of	sexual	orientation.	
Both	the	revised	concept	and	the	new	taxonomical	schema	are	intend-
ed	to	elucidate	and	improve our	everyday	concepts	in	light	of	particular	
theoretical	and	socio-political	purposes.	And,	importantly,	this	project	
is	limited	in	scope:	the	proposed	concept	and	taxonomy	of	sexual	ori-
entation	are	not	meant	 to	apply	across	all	 cultural	 contexts.	 Instead,	
my	project	constructs	a	concept	that	is	both	responsive	to	and	critical	
people,	 I	encourage	you	with	all	good	will	 to	 incorporate	a	gender-neutral	
singular	pronoun	of	your	own	choosing	into	ordinary	English	discourse.
9.	 While	 sexual	 orientation	 has	 received	 little	 attention	 in	 the	 analytical	 tra-
dition,	 the	continental	 tradition	has	a	rich	history	of	 thinking	about	sexual	
orientation	—	see	 Foucault	 (1980)	 and	Halperin	 (1990)	 and	 (2002),	 among	
others.
To	name	 just	a	 few	of	 the	worries	 that	might	be	 raised	 for	 these	
characterizations:	 (1)–(3)	assume	binary	categories	of	sex	or	gender	
(i. e.,	male/female	or	men/women)6;	(2)	and	(3)	disagree	on	whether	
sexual	orientation	concerns	gender-attraction	(attraction	to	 individu-
als	with	 certain	 genders)	 or	 sex-attraction	 (attraction	 to	 individuals	
with	certain	sexes);	and	(4)	appeals	to	the	opaque	notion	of	“ideal	con-
ditions”	for	acting	on	one’s	sexual	desires	(more	on	this	later).
Characterizations	like	these	—	assuming	they	are	attempts	to	eluci-
date	a	shared,	pre-existing	concept	of	sexual	orientation	—	reveal	that	
we	have	an	extremely	poor	grasp	of	this	concept.	And	even	if	the	char-
acterizations	are	stipulative,	we	have	good	reason	to	resist	adopting	
many	of	 them.	Inadequate	understandings	of	sexual	orientation	can	
reinforce	heteronormative	assumptions	(i. e.,	assumptions	that	hetero-
sexuality	should	be	privileged	within	society)	by	maintaining	a	major-
ity/minority	divide	between	heterosexuality	and	other	sexual	orienta-
tions	that	historically	has	been	normatively	loaded	and	policed.	They	
also	can	reinforce	cisnormative	assumptions	(i. e.,	assumptions	that	all	
persons	are	cisgender	—	that	is,	that	all	persons’	genders	are	the	ones	
assigned	to	them	at	birth	on	the	basis	of	their	anatomy)	by	failing	to	
provide	recognition	or	clarity	within	the	sexual-orientation	taxonomy	
for	persons	who	are	not	cisgender	or	who	are	attracted	to	persons	who	
are	not	cisgender.7, 8
6.	 I	here	understand	sex	as	a	classification	solely	on	 the	basis	of	human	bod-
ies’	 physical	 characteristics	 and	 gender	 as	 a	 classification	 (at	 least	 in	 part)	
on	the	basis	of	social	situatedness.	For	more	on	this	distinction,	see	section	
3.	Also,	 I	acknowledge	that	gender-identity	(the	gender	one	self-attributes)	
and	gender-expression	 (the	external	 characteristics	 and	behaviors	 that	 are	
socially	interpreted	as	communicating	that	one	belongs	to	a	certain	gender	
category)	can	come	apart.	In	this	paper,	talk	of	gender-attraction	is	most	eas-
ily	understood	as	attraction	to	certain	gender	expressions,	but	I	leave	open	
that	persons’	gender	identities	can	also	play	a	role	in	gender-attraction.
7.	 Often	this	cisnormative	assumption	is	paired	with	the	views	that	gender	is	
biologically	determined	by	one’s	 anatomy,	and	 that	gender	 is	 essentially	a	
biological	rather	than	social	category.	
8.	 Throughout	this	paper,	I	will	use	‘their’	as	a	gender-neutral	singular	pronoun.	
Some	people	may	take	grammatical	issue	with	this.	If	you	are	one	of	those	
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(if	any)	our	ordinary	concept	of	x	tracks.	The	last	project,	and	the	one	
that	best	categorizes	the	methodology	of	this	paper,	is	what	I	will	call	
the	“engineering	project”:	it	asks	about	the	purposes	of	our	concept	of	
x,	and	(if	necessary)	improves	or	replaces	the	existing	concept	to	bet-
ter	realize	the	purposes	we	want	this	concept	to	fulfill.11, 12	This	project	
takes	seriously	that,	as	Alexis	Burgess	and	David	Plunkett	put	it,	“our	
conceptual	repertoire	determines	not	only	what	we	can	think	and	say	
but	also,	as	a	result,	what	we	can	do	and	who	we	can	be”.13	Given	this	
important	feature	of	our	conceptual	repertoire,	we	can	think	of	the	en-
gineering	project	as	one	that	sets	out	to	elucidate	and	possibly	revise	
or	replace	our	everyday	concepts	in	light	of	the	impact	we	would	like	
them	to	have.	
Importantly,	the	engineering	project	is	not	required	 to	replace	or	
even	 to	 revise	 an	 existing	 concept	—	what	 is	 important	 is	 that	 the	
final	 concept	 serves	 the	 proposed	 purposes.	 In	 some	 cases,	 these	
purposes	may	be	best	served	by	preserving	(e. g.)	the	ordinary	usage,	
connotation,	 or	 extension	of	 the	 everyday	 concept	 in	question.	To	
quote	Haslanger:
[I]f	we	allow	that	everyday	vocabularies	serve	both	cog-
nitive	and	practical	purposes,	purposes	that	might	also	be	
served	by	 our	 theorizing,	 then	 a	 theory	 offering	 an	 im-
proved	understanding	of	our	(legitimate)	purposes	and/
or	 improved	conceptual	 resources	 for	 the	 tasks	at	hand	
might	 reasonably	 represent	 itself	 as	 providing	 a	 (possi-
bly	revisionary)	account	of	the	everyday	concepts.	…	The	
responsibility	 is	ours	 to	define	 [these	 concepts]	 for	our	
11.	 Haslanger	(2000),	32–33.	Haslanger	calls	this	the	“analytic	project”.	In	order	
to	distinguish	it	from	“conceptual	analysis”,	though,	which	is	more	akin	to	the	
“conceptual	project”,	I	will	refer	to	it	throughout	as	the	“engineering	project”.
12.	 Though	 I	do	not	want	 to	 take	a	 strong	stance	on	 the	nature	of	 concepts,	 I	
am	loosely	understanding	concepts	here	as	ways	of	representing	the	world.	I	
mean	this,	though,	in	a	deflationary	sense	that	remains	neutral	on	the	issue	
of	whether	concepts	can	carry	non-descriptive,	expressive	content.
13.	 Burgess	&	Plunkett	(2013),	1091.
of	our	everyday	thinking	in	contemporary	Western	society	about	sex-
ual	orientation.	
On	my	proposed	account	of	sexual	orientation,	which	I	call	“Bidi-
mensional	Dispositionalism”,	sexual	orientation	is	based	upon	a	per-
son’s	 sexual	behavioral	dispositions	under	 the	ordinary	manifesting	
conditions	 for	 these	dispositions	 (i. e.,	 the	 conditions	 corresponding	
to	applications	of	the	term	‘sexual	orientation’	and	related	terms),	and	
having	a	particular	sexual	orientation	is	based	upon	what	sex[es]	and	
gender[s]	of	persons	one	 is	 (or	 is	not)	disposed	 to	 sexually	 engage	
with	under	these	conditions.	Importantly,	these	particular	categories	
of	sexual	orientation	do	not	reference	one’s	own	sex	or	gender.10 
In	what	follows,	I	assume	non-eliminativism	about	sex	and	gender.	
I	use	the	terms	‘male’	and	‘female’	to	refer	to	sex	categories,	though	I	
do	not	assume	that	these	terms	exhaust	or	refer	to	discrete	sex	catego-
ries.	Similarly,	 I	use	 the	 terms	 ‘man’	and	 ‘woman’	 to	refer	 to	gender	
categories,	though	I	do	not	assume	that	these	terms	exhaust	or	refer	to	
discrete	gender	categories.
2. Methodology and Framework
This	section	clarifies	my	project’s	methodology	and	framework.	I	first	
discuss	the	project’s	methodology,	and	then	turn	to	the	purposes	guid-
ing	my	analysis	of	the	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	Finally,	I	distin-
guish	between	the	central	target	of	my	analysis	—	the	everyday	concept	
of	sexual	orientation	—	and	three	distinct	but	closely	related	concepts.
Methodology: The Engineering Project
In	her	work	on	gender,	Haslanger	points	out	the	importance	of	distin-
guishing	between	three	projects	that	ask	a	question	of	the	form,	What	
is	x?	One	project	is	conceptual:	it	asks	only	about	the	content	of	our	or-
dinary	concept	of	x.	Another	is	naturalistic:	it	asks	which	natural	kind	
10.	Acknowledging	 that	 some	 people	 wholly	 lack	 dispositions	 to	 sexually	 en-
gage	with	 other	 persons	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sex-	 or	 gender-attractions	will	 in-
clude	 asexuality	with	 regard	 to	 sex	 and	gender	 among	 the	 class	 of	 sexual	
orientations.
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replace	our	former	concept.	This	tension	is	fine;	I’m	not	sure	anything	
important	hangs	on	whether	my	project	 is	described	as	providing	a	
revised	or	replacement	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	Either	descrip-
tion	can	point	to	what	does matter	—	that	as	an	engineering	project,	my	
project	consists	of	two	parts:	
(I) Elucidating	purposes	ideally	served	by	our	concept	of	
sexual	orientation,	and
(II) Re-engineering	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation	(and	
the	corresponding	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation)	in	
light	of	the	purposes	described	in	(I).15 
Having	now	described	the	methodology	of	my	project,	I	will	turn	to	
describing	purposes	that	(I	argue)	are	ideally	served	by	our	concept	of	
sexual	orientation	and	clarifying	my	central	target	concept.	I	will	then	
spend	the	remainder	of	the	paper	reconstructing	this	concept	and	its	
corresponding	taxonomic	schema	in	a	way	that	fulfills	these	purposes.
Framework I: Purposes
I	propose	that	 the	 following	purposes	are	 ideally	served	by	our	con-
cept	of	sexual	orientation:
(i) Clarifies	 the	 criteria	 for	 ascribing	 sexual	 orientation,	
as	well	as	how	these	criteria	translate	into	a	taxonomic	
schema	of	sexual	orientation;
(ii) Is	 consistent	 with	 relevant	 social-scientific	 re-
search	—	in	 particular,	 research	 concerning	 sex	 and	
gender;
15.	 These	parts	could	be	conceptually	divided	 into	 two	projects,	one	of	which	
looks	 for	 suitable	 concepts	 in	 light	of	 assigned	purposes,	 and	 the	other	of	
which	engineers	revised	(or	new)	concepts	that	meet	these	purposes	(should	
suitable	ones	not	be	 found	elsewhere).	For	 simplicity,	 I	 am	 including	both	
projects	under	the	heading	of	the	‘engineering	project’.
purposes.	 In	doing	so	we	will	want	 to	be	 responsive	 to	
some	aspects	of	ordinary	usage	(and	 to	aspects	of	both	
the	connotation	and	extension	of	the	terms).14
In	this	way,	engineering	projects	may	range	in	the	descriptiveness	
and	prescriptiveness	of	their	conceptual	construction.	Given	the	pur-
poses	that	projects	assign	to	their	target	concepts,	they	might	prescribe	
no	revision	to	an	everyday	concept,	or	prescribe	revisions	that	(among	
other	things)	preserve	features	of	the	everyday	concept.	These	latter	
projects	are	descriptive	insofar	as	they	elucidate	and	maintain	certain	
features	of	the	everyday	concept,	but	prescriptive	insofar	as	they	pro-
pose	revisions	to	the	everyday	concept	in	light	of	certain	purposes.	
Haslanger	 acknowledges	 that,	 because	of	 this	flexibility,	 an	engi-
neering	project	will	confront	issues	regarding	how	conceptually	con-
servative	it	intends	to	be	—	i. e.,	whether	it	intends	to	retain,	revise,	or	
eliminate	 the	 everyday	 concept.	 My	 project	 is	 somewhat	 conserva-
tive	in	one	sense	but	not	another.	While	—	for	reasons	I	will	soon	ex-
plain	—	it	attempts	to	preserve	the	general	extension	of	our	everyday	
concept	of	sexual	orientation,	it	does	not	attempt	to	preserve	many	of	
the	connotations	associated	with	the	term	‘sexual	orientation’	or	the	
concepts	associated	with	our	current	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation.	
Given	this,	my	project	will	clarify	and	minimally	revise	our	everyday	
concept	of	sexual	orientation,	but	also	eliminate	and	replace	 the	ev-
eryday	concepts	associated	with	the	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation.	
Some	might	 take	my	 proposed	 concept	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 to	
constitute	a	new,	distinct	concept	replacing	the	former	concept,	rather	
than	revising	it.	I	can	see	both	sides	of	this	issue.	Insofar	as	my	account	
attempts	to	be	responsive	to	our	ordinary	usage	of	the	concept	of	sex-
ual	orientation	while	revising	the	concept’s	content,	it	may	be	thought	
merely	revisionary.	But	insofar	as	this	revised	content	implies	a	new	
taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation	and	significantly	changes	the	conno-
tations	of	the	term	‘sexual	orientation’,	 it	may	be	thought	to	entirely	
14.	 Haslanger	(2000),	33.
	 robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation?
philosophers’	imprint	 –		5		–	 vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016)
sex	and	gender	—	especially	with	regard	to	sexual	orientation	—	regu-
larly	create	difficulties	for	queer,	gender-nonconforming,	and	intersex	
persons,	as	well	as	their	partners.	How	should	gender-nonconforming,	
transgender,	or	intersex	persons	(or	their	partners)	describe	their	sex-
ual	orientations?	How	can	or	should	non-discrimination	laws	address	
these	sexual	orientations?	The	current	categories	of	sexual	orientation	
offer	 little	 to	no	flexibility	or	 clarity	 for	 these	 individuals.	 For	 these	
reasons,	the	current	categories	reinforce	cisnormativity	as	well	as	het-
eronormativity.	That	is,	because	the	current	categories	place	queer	ori-
entations	in	a	vast	minority	and	have	no	place	at	all	for	many	transgen-
der	or	intersex	individuals	(or	persons	attracted	to	these	individuals),	
they	perpetuate	prejudices	that	sexual	orientations	and	gender	identi-
ties	that	do	not	meet	standard	binaries	of	homosexual/heterosexual	
and	cisgender	man/cisgender	woman	are	somehow	deviant,	dysfunc-
tional,	 or	 even	 nonexistent.18	 Ideally,	 our	 concept	 of	 sexual	 orienta-
tion	would	get	 rid	of	or	at	 least	diminish	 these	harms	by	achieving	
purposes	(iii)–(iv)	above,	and	do	so	(at	least	in	part)	by	employing	the	
tools	articulated	in	purposes	(i)–(ii).	
In	addition	to	guiding	my	project,	purposes	(iii)–(iv)	also	impose	
certain	 constraints.	 In	 particular,	 they	 constrain	 the	 project	 to	 con-
struct	a	concept	of	sexual	orientation	that	is	feasible	for	public	uptake.	
Only	such	a	concept	can	move	us	toward	achieving	these	social	and	
political	purposes.	So,	rather	than	rebuilding	the	concept	of	sexual	ori-
entation	from	scratch,	I	restrict	myself	to	engineering	a	concept	that	
clarifies	and	improves	upon	the	pre-existing	structure	of	our	everyday	
concept	and	—	on	the	basis	of	this	clarification	and	improvement	—	re-
builds	and	expands	the	sexual-orientation	taxonomy.
To	put	this	slightly	differently:	I	am	not	out	to	develop	a	theoreti-
cally	ideal	or	purely	stipulative	concept	and	then	argue	that	the	term	
‘sexual	orientation’	should	be	attached	to	my	concept	rather	than	the	
18.	 Consider,	for	example,	the	well-recognized	phenomenon	known	as	“bisexual	
erasure”	(a	tendency	to	explain	away	or	simply	deny	evidence	that	persons	
are	attracted	to	both	men	and	women,	or,	on	alternative	accounts,	 females	
and	males).	(See,	e. g.,	Greenesmith	[2010].)	See	also	Stein’s	(1999)	critiques	
of	the	binary	operationalization	of	sexual	orientation	in	scientific	studies.
(iii) Reduces	or	eliminates	the	presumption	that	cishetero-
sexuality16	is	the	normatively	standard	sexual	orienta-
tion	and	all	queer	sexual	orientations	are	normatively	
deviant;17	and
(iv) Is	 conducive	 for	 establishing	 legal	 and	 social	 protec-
tions	for	persons	who	have	queer	sexual	orientations.
These	purposes	are	not	merely	stipulative;	someone	could	disagree	
with	me	concerning	whether	these	purposes	should	guide	our	concept	
of	sexual	orientation.	I	take	each	of	them,	though,	to	be	rooted	in	ev-
eryday	political	and	social	realities.	
My	reasons	for	adopting	(i)–(ii)	are	both	theoretical	and	practical.	
As	I’ve	shown,	sexual	orientation	is	understood	in	a	variety	of	conflict-
ing	ways	—	there	is	disagreement	about	how	to	articulate	the	criteria	
for	ascribing	sexual	orientation	(e. g.,	in	terms	of	gender-	or	sex-attrac-
tion),	as	well	as	corresponding	disagreement	about	the	taxonomy	of	
sexual	orientation.	There	also	are	regular	confusions	between	sex	and	
gender,	which	 suggests	 that	 these	understandings	are	not	 informed	
by	 recent	 research	 concerning	 the	distinction	between	 sex	and	gen-
der.	This	alone	immediately	reveals	a	need	for	an	elucidation	of	the	
concept	and	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation,	and	possibly	a	revision	
ensuring	their	consistency	with	relevant	research	on	sex	and	gender.
More	practically,	clarifying	the	criteria	for	ascribing	sexual	orienta-
tion	(and	how	they	 translate	 into	a	 taxonomic	schema	of	sexual	ori-
entation)	is	a	key	ingredient	in	developing	a	concept	that	serves	the	
social	and	political	purposes	stated	in	(iii)–(iv).	Confusions	between	
16.	 As	will	become	clear	in	the	subsequent	section,	because	I	understand	sexual	
orientation	 as	 concerning	 both	 sex	 and	 gender,	 I	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	 het-
erosexuality	picks	out	a	specific	sexual	orientation.	I	believe	that	talk	about	
“heterosexuality”	 in	 ordinary	 discourse	 is	 usually	 talking	 about	 “cishetero-
sexuality”	—	that	is,	the	attraction	of	a	cisgender	woman	to	a	cisgender	man	
or	vice	versa.
17.	 I	 use	 the	 term	 ‘queer’	 here	 to	 mean	 something	 like	 “not	 cisheterosexual”.	
For	reasons	that	hopefully	become	clear,	I	intentionally	avoid	terms	such	as	
‘same-sex’,	‘homosexual’,	etc.
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orientation	 that	 they	 fail	 to	 recognize.	Given	 this,	 I	will	not	address	
sexual	identity	in	what	follows.	
The	 second	 is	 romantic or emotional attraction.	 Some	 characteriza-
tions	 of	 sexual	 orientation	—	for	 example,	 that	 of	 the	American	Psy-
chological	 Association	—	understand	 sexual	 orientation	 in	 terms	 of	
“emotional,	romantic,	and/or	sexual	attractions”.21	I	grant	that	romantic	
and	emotional	attractions	are	often	reliable	evidence	of	sexual	orienta-
tion,	and	can	be	themselves	the	target	of	discrimination.	But	it	seems	
that	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation	is	distinct	from	the	concepts	of	
romantic	and	emotional	attraction	in	that	it	primarily	concerns	sexual	
behavior.	This	is	why,	for	example,	I	think	we	correctly	call	“asexual”	
persons	who	are	disposed	to	never	engage	in	sexual	behaviors,	even	
though	 they	may	 experience	 a	 range	 of	 romantic	 and	 emotional	 at-
tractions.	The	fact	that	asexuality	is	considered	(even	by	asexual	per-
sons)	to	be	a	single	category	within	the	taxonomy	of	sexual	orienta-
tion,	 despite	 asexuals	 reporting	 a	wide	 range	 of	 romantic	 and	 emo-
tional	attractions,	suggests	that	these	latter	attractions	are	captured	by	
concepts	other	than	concepts	of	sexual	orientation.22	(There	is	even	a	
distinct	 taxonomy	for	 these	romantic	and	emotional	attractions,	e. g.,	
‘biromantic’,	‘panromantic’.)	
Conversely,	 we	 can	 imagine	 that	 someone	—	or	 even	 every	 per-
son	—	who	has	sexual	attractions	that	lead	us	to	ascribe	a	sexual	orien-
tation	to	them	could	completely	lack	romantic	or	emotional	attractions.	
In	short,	it	is	not	difficult	to	think	of	examples	in	which	persons	with	
seemingly	the	same	sexual	orientation	have	vastly	differing	romantic	
or	emotional	attractions,	as	well	as	examples	in	which	sexual	orienta-
tion	is	unaccompanied	by	romantic	or	emotional	attractions.
Given	cases	like	these,	I	assume	in	what	follows	that,	while	roman-
tic	and	emotional	attractions	might	fall	under	a	concept	of	sexuality	
broadly	construed,	the	concepts	associated	with	these	attractions	are	
distinct	 from	 the	 concept	 of	 sexual	 orientation.	 For	 this	 reason,	my	
21.	 American	Psychological	Association	(2008).
22.	 See	Emens	(2014).
everyday	 concept.	 Instead,	 I	 am	 constraining	 my	 conceptual	 engi-
neering	 so	 that	 it	 is	 responsive	 to	 our	 ordinary	 usage	 by	 generally	
preserving	the	extension	of	our	everyday	concept	of	sexual	orienta-
tion.19	 I	will	say	more	about	this	soon,	but	 in	particular,	 this	means	
that	I	limit	my	concept	to	one	that	primarily	concerns	sex-attraction	
and	gender-attraction.	I	have	no	qualms	if	someone	wants	to	describe	
this	restricted	project	as	building	a	ladder	that	we	climb	in	order	to	
eventually	kick	away	and	move	on	to	a	different	concept	of	sexual	ori-
entation.	It	is	a	ladder	that	I	think	we	must	climb.	And	—	I	would	sug-
gest	—	this	pragmatic	approach	to	a	conceptual	project	is	well	suited	
for	any	project	that	hopes	to	balance	theoretical	aims	with	a	political	
and	social	agenda.20
Framework II: Target Concept
Given	my	project’s	constrained	scope,	it	is	important	to	get	a	sense	of	
the	everyday	concept’s	extension.	To	this	end,	I	will	now	argue	that	we	
should	distinguish	 the	 everyday	 concept	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 from	
three	other,	closely	related	concepts.	
The	first	 is	 sexual identity,	which	 I	understand	 to	 refer	 to	 an	 indi-
vidual’s	self-identification	with	regard	to	sexual	orientation.	Because	
sexual	 identity	 concerns	 sexual	orientation	 in	 this	way,	 the	 concept	
of	sexual	identity	is	sensitive	to	the	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	But	
we	also	acknowledge	that	someone	can	be	self-deceived	or	in	denial	
about	 their	 sexual	 orientation	 (or	 even	 lack	 the	 concepts	necessary	
for	self-identification),	while	still	being	truly	said	to	have	the	sexual	
19.	 I	say	“generally”	because	it	is	unclear	to	me	whether	our	everyday	concept	of	
sexual	 orientation	 extends	 to	 certain	non-cisheteronormative	pairings	 and	
simply	fails	to	place	them	within	its	taxonomy,	or	whether	it	fails	to	extend	
to	these	pairings.	My	project	secures	this	extension.	It	 is	also	worth	noting	
that	this	constraint	is	not	an	unusual	move	in	metaphysics	—	e. g.,	Haslanger	
(2000)	and	Sider	(2011)	also	constrain	their	conceptual	engineering	to	a	par-
ticular	phenomenon	in	light	of	certain	proposed	purposes.	It	is	also	a	move	
that	is	explicitly	discussed	in	recent	literature	on	conceptual	ethics,	such	as	
Plunkett	(2015)	and	Burgess	&	Plunkett	(2013).
20.	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	pressing	me	to	clarify	this	point.
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Admittedly,	 the	 cultural	 distinction	we	make	between	 sexual	 ori-
entation	and	sexual	druthers	seems	somewhat	arbitrary.	It	is	not	clear	
why	attraction	 to	 certain	 sexes	or	genders	 is	 considered	 relevant	 to	
one’s	sexual	orientation,	but	not	attraction	to	a	certain	hair	color,	race,	
or	economic	status.	But	sex	and	gender	are,	for	better	or	worse,	par-
ticularly	salient	social	categories	with	respect	to	sexual	orientation.	As	
a	result,	we	find	ourselves	in	the	position	of	classifying	persons’	sexual	
orientations	on	the	basis	of	their	sex-	and	gender-attractions,	and	not	
on	the	basis	of	other	sexual	attractions.	And	this	makes	persons	with	
particular	sex-	and	gender-attractions	more	vulnerable	to	discrimina-
tion	than	persons	with	attractions	to	persons	with	a	certain	hair	color	
or	economic	status.
Again,	I	am	not	generally	preserving	the	everyday	concept’s	exten-
sion	for	its	own	sake,	but	in	order	to	fulfill	certain	purposes.	And	the	
purposes	that	I’ve	proposed	are,	I	think,	best	served	by	maintaining	the	
distinction	 between	 sexual	 druthers	 and	 sexual	 orientation	 (under-
stood	in	terms	of	attraction	to	persons	with	certain	sexes	or	genders).	
No	 one	 is	 interested	 in	 creating	 nondiscrimination	 laws	 to	 protect	
people	attracted	 to	blondes	or	baritones.	We	are,	 though,	 interested	
in	creating	legal	and	social	protections	for	queer,	transgender,	gender-
nonconforming,	and	intersex	persons.	And,	as	mentioned	before,	I	am	
here	assuming	that	an	account	of	sexual	orientation	should	be	aimed	
at	 better	 realizing	 these	political	 and	 social	 purposes.	 So,	 given	 the	
pragmatic	 interests	guiding	 the	boundaries	of	 “sexual	orientation”,	 I	
think	that	I	can	best	fulfill	purposes	(iii)–(iv)	by	retaining	these	bound-
aries	and	separating	sexual	orientation	from	sexual	druthers.	For	this	
reason,	I	will	hold	fixed	that	sexual	orientation	primarily	concerns	sex-	
and	gender-attractions,	and	not	other	sexual	attractions.
That	said,	one	might	worry	that	even	once	we	take	on	board	the	
distinction	between	sexual	orientation	and	sexual	druthers,	it	remains	
vague	 because	 many	 of	 the	 traits	 that	 are	 objects	 of	 druthers	 also	
(at	least	in	part)	construct	gender.	In	other	words,	the	worry	goes,	if	
sexual	orientation	concerns	attraction	to	persons	of	a	certain	gender,	
and	gender	is	a	social	construction	that	concerns	(e. g.)	performativity	
project	 is	 not	 directly	 concerned	with	 emotional	 or	 romantic	 attrac-
tion.	That	is,	my	analysis	is	not	concerned	with	emotional	or	romantic	
attractions	that	have	no	effect	upon	one’s	dispositions	toward	sexual	
behavior,	 and	only	 indirectly	 concerned	with	 those	 that	 have	 an	 ef-
fect. Should,	for	example,	someone’s	romantic	attractions	significantly	
influence	these	dispositions,	their	romantic	attractions	will	be	part	of	
what	forms	their	sexual	orientation	under	my	account	insofar	as	they	
have	this	influence.	Any	concern	with	attraction	in	what	follows	will	
focus	upon	sexual	(and	I	mean	sexual!)	attraction	regardless	of	wheth-
er	other	forms	of	attraction	accompany	it.	To	this	end,	talk	of	attraction	
in	what	follows	generally	can	be	understood	as	shorthand	for	disposi-
tions	to	engage	in	sexual	behaviors.23
The	third	concept	to	distinguish	from	sexual	orientation	is	what	I	
call	sexual druthers,	which	refers	to	specific	preferences	of	sexual	part-
ners	within	potential	partners	according	to	one’s	sexual	orientation.	
This	is	often	referred	to	as	someone’s	“type”.24	Height,	hair	color,	body	
structure,	 and	 voice	 quality	 are	 all	 examples	 of	 traits	 about	which	
people	may	have	sexual	druthers.	In	order	to	generally	preserve	the	
extension	of	our	everyday	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	I	do	not	in-
clude	 sexual	 druthers	 in	my	 account	 of	 sexual	 orientation,	 and	 in-
stead	 focus	upon	preferences	of	 sexual	partners	with	 regard	 to	 sex	
and	gender	categories.	
23.	Michael	Rea	raises	the	interesting	question	of	what	this	distinction	(between	
emotional/romantic	attraction	and	sexual	orientation)	implies	for	someone	
who	lacks	dispositions	to	engage	in	sexual	behaviors	(perhaps,	e. g.,	due	to	
chronic	deficiency	of	 sex	hormones),	but	who	has	higher-order	desire	 for	
sexual	 intimacy.	Does	having	 only	 this	 higher-order	 desire	 preclude	 such	
a	person	 from	having	a	 sexual	orientation?	 I	would	answer	 “No”	—	not	 so	
long	as	we	consider	asexuality	a	sexual	orientation.	Asexuality	is	generally	
understood	as	 the	 lack	of	 sexual	attraction,	or	 lack	of	first-order	desire	 to	
have	sexual	contact	with	someone	else.	(See,	e. g.,	The	Asexual	Visibility	&	
Education	Network	(2012).)	Asexuals	can	and	often	do	experience	romantic	
or	emotional	attractions,	though.	And	they	might	have	higher-order	desire	
to	experience	first-order	sexual	desire	or	sexual	 intimacy.	A	person	 in	 the	
situation	that	Rea	describes	seems,	for	these	reasons,	to	be	best	categorized	
as	asexual.
24.	Of	course,	a	single	person	may	have	multiple	“types”.
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experience	no	 sex-	 or	 gender-attractions?	These	questions	press	on	
our	ordinary	 concept,	 and	 its	 embedded	assumption	 that	 there	 is	 a	
clear	line	between	sexual	druthers	and	sexual	orientation.	Happily,	I	
take	no	such	position.	Borderline	cases	like	these	make	it	clear	that	our	
social	categories	have	fuzzy	edges	and	do	not	cut	at	deep	joints.	But	
we	would	be	mistaken	to	expect	that	they	would.
For	my	purposes,	what	 is	 important	 is	 that	—	though	 the	 separat-
ing	line	can	be	fuzzy	—	the	majority	of	cases	show	that	there	clearly	is 
a	distinction	between	sexual	orientation	and	sexual	druthers.	I	leave	
it	 to	 future	 papers	 to	 further	 discuss	 borderline	 cases,	 and	whether	
these	cases	ought	to	affect	the	extension	of	our	concept	of	sexual	ori-
entation;	 the	 following	will	 aim	 toward	a	general	 account	of	 sexual	
orientation	 that	preserves	 the	 central	bases	of	 sexual	orientation	as	
it	 is	ordinarily	understood	—	namely,	 sex-	and	gender-attraction.	For	
this	 reason,	 I	will	 assume	 that	—	just	 as	 sexual	orientation	 concerns	
romantic	and	emotional	attractions	only insofar as	 they	affect	 sexual	
attraction	—	sexual	orientation	concerns	sexual	druthers	only insofar as	
features	that	are	the	object	of	druthers	go	into	constructions	of	gender	
(or	insofar	as	primary	or	secondary	sex	characteristics	that	are	objects	
of	sexual	druthers	affect	sexual	behavioral	dispositions).
3. Bidimensional Dispositionalism
In	what	follows,	I	propose	a	concept	of	sexual	orientation	that	is	de-
signed	to	satisfy	purposes	(i)–(iv).	However,	I	first	address	two	issues	
that	constrain	and	shape	my	concept	of	sexual	orientation:	the	distinc-
tions	between	sex	and	gender	and	between	behaviorism	and	disposi-
tionalism.	I	then	state	my	proposal	and	discuss	its	implications,	as	well	
as	 additional	 philosophical	 questions	 pointing	 to	 further	 expansion	
on	my	proposal.28
28.	Specifically,	 I	will	address	the	application	of	discrete	vs.	continuous	catego-
ries	of	sex	or	gender	and	essentialism	vs.	constructionism	to	accounts	of	sex-
ual	orientation.
(behaviors,	dress,	etc.)	or	social	status,	then	the	distinction	between	
sexual	orientation	and	sexual	druthers	is	vague.	I	agree	with	this	point,	
but	still	insist	that	there	are	cases	where	sexual	orientation	and	sexual	
druthers	come	apart	—	that	is,	cases	where	someone	is	attracted	to	a	
particular	feature	that	lacks	gendered	connotations.25 
In	fact,	it	may	be	that	some	persons	lack	any	gender-	or	sex-attrac-
tions,	and	are	solely sexually	attracted	to	persons	with	non-gendered	
features	 such	 as	 wealth	 or	 red	 hair.	 That	 is,	 there	may	 be	 persons	
whose	sexual	attractions	are	based	only	on	what	 I’ve	 termed	sexual	
druthers.26	This,	of	course,	puts	pressure	on	the	distinction	between	
sexual	orientation	and	sexual	druthers	—	why	don’t	we	think	that	be-
ing	 (e. g.)	 solely	 attracted	 to	 redheads	 is	 a	 sexual	orientation?27	And	
if	it	is	not,	what	sexual	orientation	do	such	persons	have,	since	they	
are	 not	 asexual	 (i. e.,	 having	 no	 sexual	 attractions	 to	 anyone),	 but	
25.	Whether	or	not	certain	druthers	have	gendered	connotations	should	be	as-
sessed	from	a	subjective	perspective.	It	could	be,	for	example,	that	someone	
has	a	druther	(or,	if	you	prefer,	fetish)	for	a	particular	shoe	color	because	for 
that person this	shoe	color	 is	associated	with	aspects	of	sexual	engagement	
that	express	 their	sexual	orientation.	While	such	druthers	might	appear	 to	
others	to	have	no	gendered	connotations,	they	have	these	connotations	for	
the	persons	who	have	them.	For	this	reason,	I	think	that	an	account	of	sexual	
orientation	should	concern	such	gender-laden	druthers,	albeit	indirectly,	as	
expressions	of	persons’	underlying	sexual	orientations.	
26.	Thanks	to	David	Black	for	bringing	this	possibility	to	my	attention.
27.	 A	more	common	example	of	a	similar	phenomenon	is	pedophilia,	or	exclu-
sive	 attraction	 to	 pre-pubescent	 children	 regardless	 of	 their	 sex	 or	 gender.	
Is	 pedophilia	 a	 sexual	 orientation?	 Those	 inclined	 to	 think	 that	 it	 is	not a	
sexual	orientation	might	think	that	it	is	instead	a	sexual	disorder,	which	(un-
like	 sexual	 orientation)	 is	 something	 that	 should	 be	 subject	 to	 psychiatric	
and	medical	treatment.	Those	inclined	to	think	that	it	is a	sexual	orientation,	
though,	 can	maintain	 that	 sexual	 orientation	 concerns	 sex-	 and	 gender-at-
tractions.	On	a	plausible	view	of	sex-categories,	these	categories	are	based	on	
continuous	and	fluid	groupings	of	primary	and	secondary	sex	characteristics.	
Because	these	characteristics	undergo	significant	change	during	puberty,	it	is	
arguable	that	humans	shift	sex-categories	during	puberty.	These	possibilities	
are	surely	not	exhaustive,	and	I	acknowledge	that	this	is	a	difficult	(as	well	as	
a	morally	and	emotionally	loaded)	case.	Undeniably,	there	are	a	host	of	simi-
lar	difficult	cases	that	beg	for	further	discussion.	Length	limitations	and	the	
freshness	of	this	topic	to	philosophical	debate	constrain	me	from	providing	
more	than	an	extremely	general	discussion	of	sexual	orientation	in	this	paper.
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think	that	understanding	sex	as	an	anatomical	category	entails	under-
standing	it	as	purely	“natural”	or	culture-independent.	Our	sex	catego-
ries	seem	to	(in	some	way)	track	anatomical	features	associated	with	
reproductive	functions,	but	these	very	anatomical	categories	of	repro-
ductive	roles	could	be	(at	least	partially)	the	result	of	cultural	practice.	
As	I	see	it,	one	can	maintain	that	both	sex	and	gender	categories	are	
(at	least	partially)	culturally	constructed	while	distinguishing	between	
them	on	the	grounds	that	they	are	constructed	upon	different	physical	
and	social	 features	and	aimed	at	 fulfilling	different	purposes.	Given	
this,	I	see	little	to	be	gained	by	adopting	the	unification	view.
Of	course	much	more	can	be	said,	but	for	the	sake	of	brevity	I	will	
now	turn	to	the	cisnormative	view.	A	pathway	to	challenging	this	view	
was	famously	laid	by	Simone	de	Beauvoir,	who	marked	sex	as	a	bio-
logical	category	and	gender	as	a	category	concerning	the	social	posi-
tion	(e. g.,	exploitation	and	oppression)	experienced	by	those	exempli-
fying	femininity.31	While	the	details	of	de	Beauvoir’s	ideas	have	been	
challenged	in	contemporary	discussions,	her	sex/gender	distinction	is	
the	standard	view	in	psychology,	sociology,	and	queer	and	women’s	
studies,	as	well	as	in	feminist	philosophy.32 
Given	this,	it	would	be	fairly	uncontroversial	for	me	to	simply	as-
sume	this	distinction	moving	forward	in	my	account	of	sexual	orienta-
tion.	It	is	worth	saying	explicitly,	though,	that	not	only	is	the	distinc-
tion	theoretically	useful,	dividing	what	seem	to	be	distinct	phenomena,	
but	it	is	also	politically	and	socially	advantageous.	For	one,	it	provides	
a	helpful	framework	through	which	to	understand	the	gender	identity	
31.	 Sveinsdóttir	(2011),	48.	As	de	Beauvoir	famously	said,	“One	is	not	born,	but	
rather	becomes,	a	woman.”	I	will	adopt	Haslanger’s	view	that	‘sex’	refers	to	
a	 classification	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 anatomy	 (e. g.,	 primary	 sex	 characteristics),	
though	this	is	compatible	with	these	classifications	having	vague	boundaries,	
or	boundaries	heavily	influenced	by	socio-political	interests.	I	am	also	sympa-
thetic	with	Haslanger’s	view	that	gender	is	not	merely	a	social	construct,	but	
is	defined	in	terms	of	social	relations	(Haslanger	[2012],	39).
32.	 For	 an	overview	of	 recent	philosophical	 approaches	 to	 sex	 and	gender,	 as	
well	 as	 the	 interaction	 between	 philosophical	 approaches	 and	 other	 (e. g.,	
psychological,	political)	approaches	 to	 sex	and	gender,	 see	Mikkola	 (2012)	
and	Haslanger	(2012).	
Preliminary Issues 
Sex and Gender
As	mentioned,	 previous	 characterizations	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 typi-
cally	and	without	argument	equate	and	assume	binary	categories	of	
sex	and	gender.	They	often	also	analyze	sexual	orientation	in	terms	
of	either	sex-attraction	 to	 the	exclusion	of	gender-attraction,	or	vice	
versa.	These	assumptions	lead	to	understandings	of	sexual	orientation	
according	to	which	sexual	orientation	is	unidimensional	—	tracking	ei-
ther	sex-	or	gender-attraction,	but	never	both	independently	of	each	
other	—	and	limited	to	a	small	number	of	discrete	sub-categories.
The	position	that	there	is	no	distinction	between	sex	and	gender	
might	be	understood	in	two	ways:	as	the	claim	that	sex	(taken	as	ana-
tomical)	wholly	determines	gender,	or	that	gender	(taken	as	socio-po-
litical	or	psychological)	wholly	determines	sex.	The	former	—	call	it	the	
“cisnormative	view”	—	is	much	more	prevalent	than	the	latter	—	call	it	
the	 “unification	view”	—	which	has	 a	 small	 presence	within	 feminist	
theory	and	other	academic	 literature.29	 In	 this	paper,	 I	 am	primarily	
concerned	with	rejecting	the	cisnormative	view.	While	I	find	the	unifi-
cation	view	provocative,	I	also	think	it	incorrect.	Much	of	the	motiva-
tion	for	the	view,	it	seems,	comes	from	the	conviction	that	we	should	
not	 posit	 sex/gender	 along	 a	nature/culture	binary,	 because	 this	 bi-
nary	has	historically	provided	justification	for	women’s	oppression,	or	
because	—	as	Linda	Alcoff	rightly	 identifies	—	“in	an	 important	sense,	
everything	is	natural”.30	But	(as	Alcoff	also	points	out)	it	is	confused	to	
29.	See,	 e. g.,	 Butler	 (1990),	 Wittig	 (1992),	 or	 Halpern	 (2002).	 Butler	 and	Wit-
tig	(both	feminist	theorists)	argue	that	sex	classifications	follow	labor-	and	
politically-driven	gender	classifications.	Wittig,	for	example,	writes,	“No	bio-
logical,	 psychological,	 or	 economic	 fate	 determines	 the	 figure	 that	 the	 hu-
man	 female	presents	 in	 society:	 it	 is	 civilization	 as	 a	whole	 that	 produces	
this	creature.”	(For	dissenting	discussion	of	these	views,	see	Alcoff	[2005].)	
In	contrast,	Halpern	(a	psychologist)	emphasizes	sex	differences	in	cognitive	
capacities,	meaning	that	one	who	understands	gender	as	a	primarily	psycho-
logical	feature	might	argue	based	on	Halpern’s	research	that	sex	differences	
follow	gender	identity.
30.	Alcoff	(2005).
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For	example,	someone	may	be	attracted	only	to	transgender	men	who	
have	 not	 had	 genital	 or	 top	 surgery,	 or	 only	 to	 cisgender	men	 and	
women.	And	given	that	we	recognize	that	conferral	of	sexual	orienta-
tion	tracks	both	gender-	and	sex-attraction,	we	also	should	recognize	
that	it	tracks	various	combinations	of	these	attractions.	For	this	reason,	
I	place	a	further	constraint	on	my	account	of	sexual	orientation:
(b)	 The	account	must	permit	 individuals’	 sexual	orientations	
to	be	based	on	both	gender-attraction	and	sex-attraction.
Someone	perfectly	happy	with	(a)	may	still	resist	(b),	and	argue	
that	sex-attraction	(or	gender-attraction)	should	be	taken	as	a	mere	
sexual	druther,	allowing	sexual	orientation	to	remain	unidimension-
al.	Consider,	for	example,	someone	who	is	attracted	to	women	and	
not	men,	but	is	only	attracted	to	cisgender	women.	Why	think	that	
this	 latter	 attraction	 is	 anything	more	 than	 a	 sexual	 druther?	 That	
is,	why	 should	we	 think	 that	 someone	 attracted	 only	 to	 cisgender	
women	 has	 a	 different	 sexual orientation	 than	 someone	 attracted	
to	 both	 transgender	 and	 cisgender	women?	This	 line	 of	 argument	
might	suggest	that,	while	we	preserve	the	extension	of	our	ordinary	
sexual-orientation	 concept,	we	 should	make	 the	 relevant	 criterion	
for	ascribing	sexual	orientation	only	gender-attraction	(or	only	sex-
attraction),	and	also	categorize	sexual	orientations	along	only	one	of	
these	dimensions.
There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 considerations	 against	 thinking	 of	 sex-
attractions	 (or	gender-attractions)	as	mere	sexual	druthers.	The	 two	
most	weighty	(and	related)	considerations	are:	(i)	the	frequency	with	
which	people	experience	sexual	attraction	not	only	to	individuals	with	
particular	 gendered	 features,	 but	 also	 to	 individuals	with	 particular	
primary	and	secondary	sex	characteristics,	and	(ii)	the	need	to	recog-
nize	 the	community	of	persons	who	are	exclusively	 (or	strongly)	at-
tracted	to	transgender	individuals,	or	who	are	themselves	transgender	
and	seeking	persons	with	these	attractions.	
or	 anatomical	 transition	 of	 (e. g.)	 gender-nonconforming,	 androgy-
nous,	and	transgender	individuals.	That	is,	because	it	separates	sex	as	
an	anatomical	category	 from	gender	as	a	category	of	social	 situated-
ness,	it	creates	the	possibility	for	understanding	how	the	two	can	be	
combined	in	a	variety	of	ways.	It	also	creates	an	avenue	for	addressing	
the	ways	 in	which	gender	categories	can	be	altered	 to	combat	patri-
archal	social	structures.	If,	for	example,	gender	is	defined	in	terms	of	
social	situatedness	such	that	(as	Haslanger	argues)	to	be	a	woman	is	
(in	part)	 to	be	 in	a	position	of	systematic	social	oppression,	 then	ac-
knowledging	this	clarifies	the	changes	that	should	and	can	be	made	to	
our	gender	categories	if	we	are	to	establish	gender	equality.33
For	all	of	(but	certainly	not	only)	these	reasons,	I	hold	that	the	fol-
lowing	 constraint	on	an	account	of	 sexual	orientation	will	move	us	
closer	to	achieving	what	were	earlier	established	as	the	purposes	ide-
ally	served	by	a	concept	of	sexual	orientation:
(a)	 The	 account	must	 be	 compatible	with	 the	distinction	be-
tween	sex	and	gender.
If	 the	 cisnormative	 assumption	 and	 unification	 view	 of	 sex	 and	
gender	are	dismissed	—	and	 I	 think	 they	should	be	—	then	 the	unidi-
mensional	view	of	sexual	orientation	also	should	be.	The	distinction	
between	sex	and	gender	allows	for	various	combinations	of	sex	and	
gender	across	 individuals,	making	 it	 clear	 that	an	account	of	 sexual	
orientation	 should	 be	 sensitive	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 individuals	may	 be	
sexually	attracted	to	persons	with	various	sex/gender	combinations.34 
33.	 See,	e. g.,	Haslanger	(2000).
34.	 I	take	it	to	be	a	fairly	uncontroversial	assumption	that	we	can (though	an	indi-
vidual	need	not)	experience	sexual	attraction	to	purely	anatomical	features	as	
well	as	gendered	features.	(I	acknowledge	that	the	boundary	between	these	
features	is	slippery.)	Given	this,	we	can	already	begin	to	see	how	sexual	ori-
entation	is	significantly	dependent	upon	both	biological	traits	and	particular	
social	 contexts.	 For	 example,	 if	 we	 hold	 that	 one’s	 sexual	 orientation	 con-
cerns	(at	least	in	part)	gender-attraction,	and	that	gender	is	merely	a	social	
construct,	this	sexual	orientation	will	be	dependent	on	placement	in	a	con-
text	that	has	gender-constructs.	
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important	 for	ensuring	 legal	and	social	protections	 for	persons	with	
these	attractions,	insofar	as	we	can	reasonably	expect	that	(e. g.)	many	
partners	 of	 transgender	 persons	 will	 encounter	 discrimination	 that	
they	would	not	if	partnered	with	cisgender	persons.	Without	concepts	
that	capture	these	attractions	as	part	of	individuals’	sexual	orientations,	
it	becomes	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	guarantee	the	protections	that	
such	individuals	deserve.	For	all	of	these	reasons,	I	maintain	(ii),	and	
disagree	with	the	position	that	either	sex-	or	gender-attraction	should	
be	classified	as	mere	sexual	druthers.
Of	 course,	 adopting	 (a)	 and	 (b)	 does	 not	 resolve	 the	 issue	 of	
whether	sex	or	gender	(and	therefore	sexual	orientation)	should	be	
understood	in	terms	of	discrete	or	continuous	categories.	I	revisit	this	
issue	 in	discussing	my	account’s	 implications.	But	 it	 is	worth	noting	
here	that	this	neutrality	is,	I	think,	appropriate	for	a	general	account	
of	sexual	orientation.	Understanding	sexual	orientation	categories	as	
discrete	or	continuous	should	piggyback	on,	and	not	decide,	whether	
we	understand	sex	and	gender	categories	as	discrete	or	 continuous.	
And	the	debate	over	this	issue	has	not	reached	a	clear	consensus.
For	similar	reasons,	my	project	does	not	take	a	precise	stance	on	
which	 features	 are	 the	 basis	 of	 sex	 and	 gender	 categories.	 As	 seen	
from	my	discussion	so	far,	 I	do	assume	that	sex	and	gender	are	real	
(i. e.,	 non-eliminativism),	 that	 sex	 and	 gender	 are	 distinct,	 and	 that	
sex	categories	are	related	to	anatomical	features	while	gender	catego-
ries	are	related	to	relational	and	social	features.	(Of	course,	there	may	
be	overlap	 in	 the	 features	 that	provide	the	basis	 for	sex	and	gender	
ascriptions	—	what’s	 important	 is	 that	 they	 are	 not	 identical.)	 More	
specific	theories	of	sex	and	gender	can	be	filled	into	the	forthcoming	
schematic	understanding	of	sexual	orientation	(and	its	 taxonomy).	 I	
purposively	build	this	flexibility	into	my	account	in	order	to	construct	
a	concept	of	sexual	orientation	(and	of	its	taxonomy)	that	can	be	struc-
turally	preserved	even	when	the	number	or	understanding	of	recog-
nized	sex	and	gender	categories	undergoes	shift.37
37.	 Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	pressing	me	to	clarify	this	feature	of	my	
project.
The	first	consideration	is	fairly	straightforward:	it	is	simply	the	ob-
servation	that,	in	addition	to	attraction	to	particular	genders,	persons	
can	also	be	exclusively	interested	in	partners	with	particular	sex	char-
acteristics.	 It	 is	not	unusual,	 for	example,	 for	persons	 to	become	un-
interested	in	pursuing	a	relationship	with	someone	upon	discovering	
that	they	are	transgender	or	intersex.	
At	first,	 one	might	be	 tempted	 to	 chalk	up	all	 scenarios	 like	 this	
to	transphobia	or	other	prejudices,	and	not	these	persons’	sexual	ori-
entations.	However,	 there	also	are	numerous	cases	within	 the	grow-
ing	“trans-oriented”	community	of	persons	who	experience	strong	or	
exclusive	 sexual	 attraction	 to	 transgender	 persons.35	 These	 persons	
report	 feeling	misplaced	among	 the	current	categories	of	 sexual	ori-
entation,	identifying	neither	as	straight	nor	as	gay.	Some,	for	example,	
consider	themselves	a	“different	kind	of	gay”	—	indicating	that	the	cur-
rent	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation	simply	fails	to	capture	their	sexual	
orientation,	since	 they	experience	strong	or	exclusive	attraction	spe-
cifically	to	persons	who	are	not	cisgender.	This	failure	is	also	reflected	
within	 academic	 literature,	where	 a	 variety	 of	 terms	have	been	 sug-
gested	for	these	individuals	(e. g.,	‘MSTW’ [‘men	sexually	interested	in	
transwomen’],	‘gynemimetophilia’/‘andromimetophilia’).36 
While	—	unsurprisingly	—	none	of	these	terms	have	caught	on,	the	
community	 of	 trans-oriented	 persons	 (and	 the	 research	 concerning	
this	community)	suggests	that	individuals	can	have	exclusive	sexual	
preference	for	transgender	persons	that	is	not	caused	by	social	preju-
dice.	Similarly,	one	would	expect,	individuals	can	have	unprejudiced	
exclusive	preference	for	cisgender	persons.	Recognition	of	these	pos-
sibilities	is	not	only	important	for	trans-oriented	persons;	it	is	also	im-
portant	for	transgender	persons	who	may	experience	rejection	by	both	
“straight”	and	“gay”	potential	partners,	and	who	are	seeking	someone	
who	is	(though	perhaps	are	not	exclusively)	trans-oriented.	It	is	also	
35.	 See	www.transoriented.com	or	the	most	recent	work	of	British	journalist	and	
transgender	 rights	activist	Paris	Lees	on	 the	question,	 ‘Is	 trans-oriented	an	
emerging	sexual	orientation?’
36.	See,	e. g.,	Weinberg	&	Williams	(2010);	Money	&	Lamacz	(1984).	
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psychological	states,	except	perhaps	states	that	can	be	in	turn	reduced	
to	behavior.	We	can	understand	this	view	—	behaviorism	—	as	the	fol-
lowing	claim:
A	 person’s	 sexual	 orientation	 is	 determined	 solely	 by	
their	observable	sexual	behavior.38
In	other	words,	under	a	behaviorist	account,	an	individual’s	sexual	
orientation	is	decided	simply	by	looking	at	their	sexual	behaviors,	and	
seeing	what	sex[es]	and	gender[s]	of	persons	they	sexual	engage	with.	
For	example,	 if	 they	only	sexually	engage	with	cisgender	men,	their	
sexual	orientation	is	ascribed	accordingly.	
An	 immediate	 difficulty	 for	 behaviorism	 is	 determining	what	 be-
haviors	 and	 span	 of	 time	 are	 relevant	 to	 someone’s	 sexual	 orienta-
tion.	Even	setting	this	aside,	though,	three	more	egregious	problems	
remain.39	First,	behaviorism	doesn’t	allow	that	individuals	can	behav-
iorally	 repress	 their	 sexual	 orientations.	 Consider,	 for	 example,	 the	
case	of	Episcopal	Bishop	Gene	Robinson,	a	cisgender	man	who,	after	
privately	identifying	himself	as	gay	during	seminary,	was	married	and	
faithful	to	a	cisgender	woman	for	fifteen	years.40	Cases	like	these	are	
extremely	common	within	 the	LGBTQ	community	—	under	extreme	
social	pressure	to	conform	to	cisheteronormativity,	many	individuals	
enter	so-called	“straight”	relationships	and	so	behaviorally	(if	not	also	
psychologically)	 repress	 their	 sexual	desires.	Additionally,	homeless	
LGBTQ	persons	 are	 often	 forced	 into	 prostitution,	 thereby	 sexually	
engaging	with	individuals	of	sexes	and	genders	that	these	persons	do	
not	necessarily	find	sexually	desirable.41
38.	Alternatively,	Edward	Stein	describes	this	as	the	view	that	“a	person’s	sexual	
orientation	is	indexed	to	his	or	her	sexual	behavior”	(Stein	[1999],	42).
39.	For	further	discussion	of	the	merits	and	demerits	of	behaviorism,	see	Stein	
(1999).
40.	Robinson	(2012).
41.	 Ray	(2006).
Conditions	(a)	and	(b)	are	also	intended	to	be	neutral	with	regard	
to	whether	we	 can	 in	 the	 future	 adopt	 further dimensions	of	 sexual	
orientation,	and	subsequently	expand	our	concept	of	sexual	orienta-
tion.	As	discussed	previously,	my	current	project	 is	 limited	 to	 these	
two	dimensions	because	it	aims	to	construct	a	readily	accessible	but	
politically	and	socially	beneficial	concept	of	sexual	orientation.
Behaviorism and Dispositionalism 
The	previous	 subsection	argued	 that	we	 should	 take	 sexual	orienta-
tion	to	involve	both	sex-	and	gender-attraction.	But	it	is	not	clear	how	
to	 assess	 these	 attractions	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 someone’s	 sexual	
orientation.	The	task	of	clarifying	the	criteria	for	ascribing	sexual	ori-
entation	and	how	these	criteria	translate	into	a	taxonomic	schema	of	
sexual	orientation,	then,	is	not	complete.	
The	 following	part	of	my	project	continues	 this	 task.	 It	 is	primar-
ily	descriptive	in	nature,	though	it	will	also	contain	a	prescriptive	ele-
ment.	It	is	centrally	aimed	at	further	elucidating	criteria	for	ascribing	
sexual	orientation	as	well	as	articulating	(in	light	of	social	and	politi-
cal	motivations)	criteria	for	placing	individuals	within	a	taxonomy	of	
sexual	orientation.
The	following	discussion	will	compare	two	main	approaches	to	this	
task:	behaviorism and	 ideal dispositionalism.	Both	of	 these	approaches,	
I	will	 argue,	 fail	 to	provide	an	acceptable	analysis	of	 sexual	orienta-
tion	because	both	insist	on	overly	rigid	conditions	for	ascribing	sexual	
orientation	—	behaviorism	insists	on	rigid	actual	conditions,	and	ideal	
dispositionalism	insists	on	rigid	ideal	conditions.	I	conclude	by	dem-
onstrating	how	a	different	 form	of	dispositionalism	—	call	 it	ordinary 
dispositionalism	—	captures	 an	 intuitive	 balance	 between	 actual	 and	
ideal	conditions	for	ascribing	sexual	orientation.
Behaviorism
One	 way	 of	 understanding	 sexual	 orientation	 is	 as	 nothing	 over	
and	 above	 (i. e.,	 as	 reducible	 to)	 one’s	 observable behaviors —	that	 is,	
as	 something	 solely	 concerning	 behavior	 and	 not	 at	 all	 concerning	
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in	terms	of	individuals’	dispositions to	engage	in	sexual	behaviors	with	
a	certain	class	of	persons	(rather	than	their	actual	sexual	behaviors),	
and	 that	concern	psychological	states	only	 insofar	as	 they	 influence	
individuals’	behavioral	dispositions.
After	assuming	this	shift	to	talk	of	dispositions,	though,	significant	
and	difficult	questions	remain.	A	standard	account	of	dispositions	tells	
us	that:
Something	x	has	the	disposition	to	exhibit	manifestation	
m in	 response	 to	 being	 situated	 in	 stimulating	 circum-
stance	c iff,	if	x were	to	be	situated	in	c, it	would	exhibit	m.43
That	is,	for	example,	a	match	is	disposed	to	light	(i. e.,	is	flammable)	
in	response	to	being	in	a	certain	circumstance	if	and	only	if,	were	the	
match	in	that	circumstance,	it	would	light.	Applying	this	to	sexual	ori-
entation,	we	can	let	x	range	across	the	domain	of	human	persons,	and	
let	m	be	engagement	in	sexual	behavior	(broadly	construed)	with	per-
sons	of	a	certain	sex	and	gender.	But	determining	what	c	should	be	is	a	
much	more	complicated	task.	And	without	specifying	c,	dispositional-
ism	gives	us:	
A	 person’s	 sexual	 orientation	 is	 determined	 solely	 by	
what	 sex[es]	 and	gender[s]	of	persons	S	 is	disposed	 to	
sexually	engage	under	certain	stimulating	circumstances.
This	 claim	 is	 enough	 to	 get	 us	 to	 the	position	 that	 there	 is	 some 
particular	 scrutability	 basis	 of	 sexual	 orientation	—	namely,	 relevant	
sexual	behavioral	dispositions.	Without	specifying	the	conditions	un-
der	which	these	relevant	dispositions	manifest,	though,	we	have	not	
made	much	headway	beyond	behaviorism.	To	assign	actual	conditions	
to	 c would	 make	 the	 view	 indistinguishable	 from	 behaviorism	—	if	
the	manifesting	 conditions	 are	 actual	 conditions,	 then	 the	 relevant	
43.	 Choi	(2008),	796.	For	simplicity,	I	have	removed	the	variable	ranging	across	
times.
But,	by	behaviorist	lights,	it	is	correct	to	categorize	these	individu-
als’	 sexual	 orientations	 according	 to	 their	 coerced	behaviors,	 rather	
than	according	to	their	(freely	or	forcibly)	behaviorally	repressed	de-
sires.	It	seems	obvious	to	me	that	this	is	a	bad	result.	Because	sexual	
behavior	can	be	—	and,	for	LGBTQ	persons,	frequently	is	—	coerced	by	
societal	 pressures,	we	must	 understand	 sexual	 orientation	 as	 some-
thing	“deeper”	than	observable	behavior.	Even	if	influenced	by	social	
pressures,	sexual	orientation	cannot	be	explicitly	 forced	upon	some-
one	by	these	pressures.42	To	deny	this	is	to	do	an	injustice	to	a	large	
number	of	LGBTQ	persons,	especially	in	countries	where	queer	sexu-
al	behavior	can	result	in	prison	or	even	death.
Two	other,	related	problems	for	behaviorism	regard	its	implications	
for	 voluntary	 celibates	 and	 persons	who	 are	 not	 sexually	 active,	 as	
well	as	sexually	active	persons	in	situations	lacking	a	variety	of	poten-
tial	sexual	partners	(e. g.,	prisons).	Behaviorism	wrongly	dictates	that	
persons	in	the	first	situation	either	lack	sexual	orientations	or	ought	to	
be	classified	as	asexual,	and	that	the	sexual	orientations	of	persons	in	
the	second	situation	should	be	determined	with	no	regard	to	the	ex-
tremity	of	their	circumstances.	These	too	are	bad	results,	and	ones	that	
blatantly	conflict	with	the	general	extension	of	our	everyday	concept	
of	sexual	orientation.
Ideal Dispositionalism
A	plausible	account	of	sexual	orientation	should	account	for	situation-
ally	 specific	 sexual	 behaviors.	 Behaviorism	 fails	 to	 do	 this.	And	 yet	
behaviorism	admittedly	 captures	 something	 important	 about	 sexual	
orientation:	our	 concept	of	 sexual	orientation	 tracks	 (with	qualifica-
tions)	sexual	behavior,	and	not	self-	or	other-identification,	emotions,	
or	purely	psychological	states.	But	insisting	that	it	concerns	only	actual 
behavior	is,	as	we	have	seen,	riddled	with	problems.	For	this	reason,	I	
propose	that	analyses	of	sexual	orientation	should	move	toward	dis-
positional	accounts	—	that	is,	accounts	that	define	sexual	orientation	
42.	 See,	 for	 example,	 the	 near-universal	 recognition	 of	 the	 total	 failure	 of	 so-
called	“reparative	therapy”.
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While	I	think	that	this	type	of	proposal	rightly	pushes	against	be-
haviorism’s	 rigid	 focus	on	actual conditions,	 I	 also	 think	 that	 the	ex-
treme	shift	to	“ideal”	conditions	would	create	two	different	problems.	
First,	this	view	legitimizes	a	worrisome	cross-cultural	projection	
of	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	The	ideal	conditions	for	(e. g.)	
ancient	Greeks	to	realize	their	sexual	desires	might	vastly	differ	from	
the	 ideal	 conditions	 for	 (e. g.)	 a	 contemporary	 European	 or	 North	
American.46	 If,	 for	 example,	 political	 power	 dynamics	were	 signifi-
cantly	built	into	their	sexual	desires,	then	the	ideal	conditions	for	an-
cient	Greeks	acting	on	sexual	desires	might	be	unlike	the	conditions	
we	think	of	as	ideal	for	acting	on	our	sexual	desires	—	perhaps	they	
would	include	a	specific	political	scenario.	Likewise	for	any	culture	
in	which	sexual	desires	largely	concern	(e. g.)	social	status,	wealth,	or	
particular	survival	skills,	not	to	mention	ones	where	the	recognized	
sexes	or	genders	differ	 from	those	built	 into	our	concept	of	sexual	
desire.47	And	yet	 the	“ideal	conditions”	view	suggests	 that	our	con-
cept	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 can	 be	 aptly	 applied	within	 all	 of	 these	
widely	ranging	“ideal	conditions”.	 In	other	words,	 the	view	implies	
that	we	can	ascribe	sexual	orientation	(as we understand it)	to	all	hu-
man	beings	across	cultures	by	holding	fixed	their	sexual	desires	and	
projecting	them	into	corresponding	“ideal	conditions”,	regardless	of	
how	foreign	these	conditions	are	to	the	conditions	that	correspond	
to	contemporary	concepts	of	sexual	desire.	But	given	how	tightly	our	
concept	of	sexual	desire	is	entwined	in	our	concept	of	sexual	orien-
tation,	I	am	doubtful	that	sexual	orientation	can	be	cross-culturally	
applied	to	this	extent.	For	this	reason,	this	approach	would	seem	to	
46.	 For	example,	Miriam	Reumann’s	(2005)	American Sexual Character	develops	
a	compelling	case	for	the	existence	of	uniquely	American	sexual	desires	and	
patterns,	shaped	by	uniquely	American	politics,	social	life,	gender	roles,	and	
culture,	as	well	as	racial	and	economic	divides.	The	main	takeaway	for	the	
purpose	of	 this	paper	 is	 that	 it	would	be	naïve	—	and,	 in	 fact,	 simply	 incor-
rect	—	to	assume	that	sexual	desire	has	a	universal	and	cross-culturally	con-
sistent	character.
47.	 Interestingly,	Stein	addresses	this	possibility	later	in	his	book	amidst	a	discus-
sion	of	essentialism	and	constructionism.
dispositions	should	be	those	dispositions	manifested	in	actual	condi-
tions	—	that	 is,	actual	behaviors.	And	 this	 is	precisely	what	we	want	
to	 avoid.	To	 capture	 the	general	 extension	of	our	 everyday	 concept,	
we	will	need	a	different	theory	of	what	circumstances	manifest	these	
dispositions	—	one	less	narrow	than	“actual	conditions”,	and	more	in-
formative	than,	say,	“all	the	physical	facts”.	
In	Edward	Stein’s	The Mismeasure of Desire, he	proposes	that	the	dis-
positions	 relevant	 to	determining	sexual	orientation	manifest	 “under 
ideal conditions”.44	He	goes	on	to	say,	“Conditions	are	ideal	if	there	are	
no	forces	to	prevent	or	discourage	a	person	from	acting	on	his	or	her	
[sexual]	desires,	 that	 is,	when	 there	 is	 sexual	 freedom	and	a	variety	
of	appealing	sexual	partners	available.”45	According	to	Stein,	then,	we	
can	understand	 sexual	 orientation	 in	 terms	of	 the	 sexual	 behaviors	
someone	would	engage	in	if	nothing	—	nothing at all	—	were	stopping	
them.	While	it	is	not	clear	that	Stein	is	attempting	to	capture	the	gen-
eral	extension	of	our	ordinary	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	his	pro-
posal	suggests	that	one	way	to	fill	out	the	dispositional	schema	above	
is	as	follows:
A	 person’s	 sexual	 orientation	 is	 determined	 solely	 by	
what	 sex[es]	 and	gender[s]	of	persons	S	 is	disposed	 to	
sexually	engage	under	ideal conditions.
In	other	words,	Stein	suggests	that	sexual	orientation	is	determined	
by	how	someone	would	sexually	behave	if	we	held	fixed	their	sexual	
desires	and	ensured	that	nothing is	stopping	them	from	acting	on	those	
desires.	We	can	then	consider	whether	Stein’s	suggestion	can	be	used	
to	capture	the	extension	of	our	ordinary	concept	of	sexual	orientation	
by	specifying	that	the	relevant	features	of	these	sexual	behaviors	are	
the	sex[es]	and	gender[s]	of	the	persons	that	they	involve.
44.	 Stein	(1999),	45.	My	emphasis.
45.	 Stein	(1999),	45.
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Ordinary Dispositionalism
The	 problems	 facing	 behaviorism	 and	 ideal	 dispositionalism	 may	
be	 avoided	by	 appealing	 to	 conditions	 somewhere	 between	 “actual”	
and	 “ideal”	 conditions.	 One	 possibility	—	which	 I	 here	 tentatively	
adopt	—	incorporates	 an	 adaptation	 of	 Sungho	 Choi’s	 notion	 of	 “or-
dinary”	manifestation	conditions	for	a	given	disposition.	Choi	argues	
that	it	is	possible	to	articulate	manifesting	conditions	for	dispositions	
that	will	not	be	subject	to	the	standard	counterexamples	to	analyses	
of	dispositions	(e. g.,	 “masked”	or	“finkish”	dispositions),50	but	which	
also	will	not	be	vacuous	(e. g.,	“if	it	were	struck,	then,	unless	the	match	
didn’t	light,	it	would	light”).51	He	proposes	that	this	challenge	is	met	
by	examining	the	purpose	behind	our	concept	of	a	given	disposition,	
which	 in	 turn	 reveals	what	manifesting	 conditions	 are	 conceptually	
connected	 to	 that	 disposition.	 To	 put	 this	 slightly	 differently:	 Choi	
suggests	that	whatever	conditions	those	having	the	concept	consider	
“ordinary”	manifesting	conditions	for	that	disposition	are	the	relevant	
manifesting	conditions	for	that	disposition.	
	In	a	slight	divergence	from	Choi,	I	suggest	instead	that	the	relevant	
manifesting	conditions	for	the	dispositions	determining	sexual	orien-
tation	are	not	the	conditions	that	those	who	possess	the	concept	con-
sider “ordinary”,	but	the	conditions	under	which	people	in fact apply	the	
term	‘sexual	orientation’	(and	relevantly	associated	terms).52	Or,	more	
50.	A	“finkish”	disposition	is	one	whose	stimulus	conditions	also	remove	the	dis-
position	—	for	example,	a	glass’s	disposition	to	break	is	finkish	if,	every	time	
it	is	struck,	God	hardens	the	glass	so	that	it	is	no	longer	disposed	to	break.	
A	“masked”	disposition	is	one	that	is	simply	prevented	from	manifesting	un-
der	 the	 stimulus	 conditions	—	for	example,	 a	glass’s	disposition	 to	break	 is	
masked	if	it	is	bubble-wrapped	when	it	is	struck.	See	Choi	&	Fara	(2014).	
51.	 Choi	(2008).
52.	 I	remain	neutral	on	the	question	of	whether	this	sort	of	account	should	be	ap-
plied	widely	across	all	types	of	dispositions.	Perhaps	some	of	the	manifesting	
conditions	for	some	dispositions	can	be	given	a	purely	physics-based	expla-
nation,	for	example.	Here,	I	only	commit	to	an	account	for	determining	the	
ordinary	manifesting	conditions	for	the	dispositions	relevant	for	determining	
sexual	orientation.	(Thanks	to	Michael	Rauschenbach	for	raising	this	issue.)
get	the	extension	of	our	concept	wrong,	extending	it	beyond	its	ap-
propriate	reach.48
Second,	there	are	some	empirical	reasons	to	think	that	sexual	de-
sires	cannot	be	“held	fixed”	independently	of	someone’s	actual	social	
context,	and	that	these	desires	would	not	remain	constant	when	pro-
jected	 into	 ideal	 circumstances.	 In	particular,	when	 surrounded	by	
a	vast	variety	of	 sexual	partners	and	 lacking	any	 inhibitions,	 there	
is	 evidence	 suggesting	 one’s	 sexual	 desires	—	and	 so,	 one’s	 sexual	
behaviors	—	will	undergo	significant	alteration	from	what	they	were	
under	 ordinary	 circumstances.	 In	 particular,	 social	 psychologists	
have	discovered	that	sexual	desires	frequently	increase	or	decrease	
(depending	on	other	characteristics	of	 the	 individual)	 in	situations	
with	high	sexual	opportunity.	The	corresponding	principles,	known	
as	 the	 “satisfaction	 principle”	 (high	 opportunity	 decreases	 desire)	
and	 the	 “adaptation	 principle”	 (high	 opportunity	 increases	 desire)	
are	perfect	examples	of	why	we	should	doubt	that	individuals’	sexual	
desires	would	remain	constant	when	they	are	placed	in	a	situation	
with	complete	sexual	freedom	and	availability.49	But	if	these	desires	
undergo	significant	shift,	 then	we	should	expect	that	an	“ideal	con-
ditions”	account	of	sexual	orientation	will	 frequently	dictate	ascrip-
tions	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 that	 conflict	 with	 our	 everyday	 under-
standing	of	sexual	orientation. To	put	this	in	slightly	stronger	terms:	
there	 is	 some	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 it	would	 significantly	 change the 
subject	 from	what	we	were	originally	 talking	about	when	we	were	
talking	about	sexual	orientation.	
48.	One	might	respond	on	Stein’s	behalf	that	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation	
(and	other	cultures’	related	concepts)	should	be	understood	as	socially-his-
torically	constrained,	such	that	it	may	not	be	cross-culturally	applied.	While	
this	is	not	clear	from	Stein’s	text,	and	I	would	still	have	concerns	about	the	
view	(see	the	following	argument),	I	do	think	that	this	would	improve	the	ac-
count.	In	my	own	proposal	—	and	as	we	will	soon	see	—	I	attempt	to	develop	
a	way	of	ensuring	this	social-historical	sensitivity	by	looking	to	ordinary	lan-
guage	use	as	a	guide	to	the	relevant	manifesting	conditions.
49.	 See,	for	example,	Gebauer,	Baumeister,	Sedikides,	&	Neberich	(2014).
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Central	to	this	proposal	is	the	idea	that	finding	the	ordinary	mani-
festing	conditions	for	a	disposition	means	looking	to	the	(often	prag-
matic)	goals	determining	application	of	the	term	referring	to	that	dis-
position. In	the	case	of	sexual	orientation,	then,	the	manifesting	con-
ditions	for	the	behavioral	dispositions	relevant	to	determining	sexual	
orientation	must	be	understood	within	the	framework	of	the	purposes	
behind	the	everyday	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation	—	finding	
potential	partners,	establishing	laws	(be	they	protective	or	discrimina-
tory),	predicting	behavior,	enabling	scientific	research	of	sexual	attrac-
tion,	and	so	on.56	These	purposes	determine	the	“ordinary”	conditions	
under	which	the	term	is	applied	—	that	is,	they	are	the	conditions	cor-
responding	to	the	operative	concept.	
Importantly,	 using	 these	 conditions	 as	 the	 relevant	 manifesting	
conditions	 for	 a	particular	disposition	does	not	mean	 forfeiting	 any	
revision	to	the	everyday	operative	concept.	It	simply	means	that	these	
conditions	 are	 built	 into	 the	 revised	 concept,	 guaranteeing	 that	 the	
everyday	concept’s	extension	is	generally	preserved.	These	conditions	
only	provide	 constraints	on	 the	eligible	 criteria	 for	 ascribing	 sexual	
orientation	—	they	 do	 not	 determine	 these	 criteria,	much	 less	 deter-
mine	the	taxonomy	resulting	from	them.	
More	 needs	 to	 be	 said	 about	 what	 these	 ordinary	 conditions	
are	—	that	 is,	what	are the	conditions	corresponding	 to the	everyday	
operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation?	Or,	in	other	words,	what	con-
ditions	lie	behind	our	ascriptions	of	sexual	orientation?
56.	While	these	purposes	at	bottom	will	result	in	the	same	behaviors	as	the	pur-
poses	behind	 the	manifest	 concept	of	 sexual	orientation,	 they	 importantly	
differ	 in	 the	 interpretation	of	 those	behaviors.	Whereas	those	applying	the	
term	‘sexual	orientation’	may	take	themselves	to	be	(e. g.)	identifying	moral	
failing	or	categorizing	psychological	defects,	this	is	simply	using	fictions	as	
a	mask	 for	what	Haslanger	calls	 the	 “explicitly	 social	 content	of	 the	opera-
tive	concept”.	So	too,	those	applying	the	term	may	take	the	manifesting	con-
ditions	 relevant	 to	 sexual	 orientation	 to	 be	 anything	 from	 “having	 certain	
genetics”	 to	 “being	cursed	by	God”,	but	 these	cannot	be	 the	conditions	we	
are	concerned	with.	We	are	instead	concerned	with	the	conditions	that	actu-
ally determine	application	of	the	term	‘sexual	orientation’,	regardless	of	what	
someone	thinks	they	are	doing	when	applying	it.	
simply,	the	relevant	manifesting	conditions	just	are	the	conditions	un-
der	which	ascriptions	of	sexual	orientation	typically	take	place.
Here	I	follow	Haslanger,	who	makes	a	useful	distinction	between	
“operative”	 and	 “manifest”	 concepts:	The	operative	 concept	of	 “cool”,	
for	example,	is	“the	concept	that	actually	determines	how	we	apply	the	
term	to	cases,	i. e.,	(roughly)	being	such	as	to	conform	to	the	standards	
of	the	in-group”.53	In	contrast,	the	manifest	concept	of	cool	is	“the	con-
cept	that	users	of	the	term	typically	take	themselves	to	be	applying,	i. e.,	
being	 intrinsically	or	objectively	cool”.54	By	defining	 “ordinary”	man-
ifesting	 conditions	 in	 terms	of	 the	 concept	 those	 applying	 the	 term	
take	themselves	to	have,	Choi	restricts	our	search	for	these	conditions	
to	the	conditions	attached	to	manifest	concepts.	But	these	conditions	
may	 be	 nonexistent	 (i. e.,	 “intrinsic	 coolness”)	 or	 severely	mistaken.	
Better,	 I	 think,	 is	to	identify	the	“ordinary”	conditions	as	those	corre-
sponding	to	the	everyday	operative	concept	—	that	is,	the	conditions	
corresponding	to	applications	of	the	relevant	terms.	
Consider,	for	example,	a	match’s	disposition	of	flammability.	Using	
this	adaption	of	Choi,	we	look	at	the	operative	concept	of	“flammabil-
ity”	and	find	that	the	purpose	of	it	is	to	determine	whether	a	match	will	
light	when	it	 is	struck	in	normal	temperatures,	when	dry,	etc.	These	
conditions,	that	is,	determine	how	we	apply	the	term	‘flammable’	to	a	
match.	Because	of	this,	they	are	the	relevant	manifesting	conditions	c 
in	the	statement	‘A	match	is	disposed	to	light	in	response	to	being	situ-
ated	in	stimulating	circumstance	c iff,	if	the	match	were	to	be	situated	
in	c, it	would	light.’55
53.	 Haslanger	(1995),	102.
54.	Haslanger	(1995),	102.
55.	 One	might	worry	that	this	account	is	circular	—	that	it	relies	on	the	“ordinary	
manifesting	conditions”	 that	 identify	a	disposition	by	appealing	to	 the	con-
cept	of	that	very	disposition.	Choi	(2008)	argues	that	this	objection	fails.	As	
he	points	out,	because	 the	ordinary	conditions	 for	a	disposition are	under-
stood	as	“extrinsic	conditions	that	are	ordinary	to	those	who	possess	the	dis-
positional	 concept”,	 those	 persons	need	no	 knowledge	of	 a	 conceptual	 ac-
count	of	the	disposition	in	question.
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corresponding	to	exclusive	attraction	to	women.57	This	sort	of	case	il-
lustrates	that	we	expect	an	explanatory	relation	to	hold	between	one’s	
sexual	orientation	and	 the	sex	or	gender	of	 the	persons	 they	are	at-
tracted	to.
(II)	 The	 operative	 concept	 assumes	 attraction	 to	 certain	 per-
sons	while	having	a	reasonable	diversity	of	potential	sexu-
al	partners.
This	generalization	is	far	from	Stein’s	suggestion	that	sexual	orien-
tation	is	based	on	attractions	with	no restriction	on	sexual	partners.	But	
it	captures	why	we	do	not	consider	behaviors	in	outlying	circumstanc-
es	where	potential	partners	are	extremely	limited	or	homogenous	(e. g.,	
prisons,	boarding	schools,	deserted	 islands)	as	 reliable	 indicators	of	
one’s	sexual	orientation.
(III)	 The	operative	concept	assumes	that	one	is	willing	and	able	
to	sexually	engage	with	other	persons.	
We	refuse	to	ascribe	sexual	orientations	to	someone	on	the	basis	
of	their	actual	sexual	behaviors	if	(e. g.)	they	are	voluntarily	celibate,	
subject	 to	 sexual	 contact	without	 consent,	 or	 possess	 a	prohibitive	
medical	condition.	These	scenarios	indicate	that	it	is	also	important	
to	the	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation	that	the	behaviors	rel-
evant	 to	 ascribing	 sexual	 orientation	 are	 ones	 that	 are	 engaged	 in	
willingly	 and	with	 the	physical	 and	psychological	 ability	 to	 engage	
or	not	engage	in	the	behavior.58	It	might	also	explain	why	we	judge	
57.	 Or	because	Elijah	thinks they	are	women.	This	would	leave	room	for	cases	in	
which,	e. g.,	someone	attracted	to	cisgender	men	is	attracted	to	someone	they	
take	to	be	a	cisgender	man,	but	who	is	anatomically	female.	
58.	Of	course,	some	(and	perhaps	all)	asexual	persons	will	never	be	in	a	situation	
in	which	they	are	willing	to	engage	in	sexual	behavior.	In	that	case,	we	can	
determine	that,	because	it	is	impossible	for	them	to	meet	condition	III,	they	
do	 not	 have	 any	 sexual	 behavioral	 dispositions	 that	would	 be	manifested	
under	the	ordinary	conditions	—	that	is,	they	are	asexual.	This	distinguishes	
asexuals	from	(e. g.)	voluntary	celibates.
My	primary	goal	 in	moving	away	from	actual	or	 ideal	conditions,	
and	 toward	 the	conditions	corresponding	 to	 the	everyday	operative	
concept	of	sexual	orientation,	is	to	escape	the	rigidity	of	both	behav-
iorism	and	ideal	dispositionalism.	I	want	to	avoid	a	view	that	ascribes	
sexual	orientation	on	the	basis	of	only	observable	behaviors,	or	only	
behaviors	within	unattainable,	potentially	culturally	distant	ideal	con-
ditions.	This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	 the	operative	concept	 is	without	 sub-
stance.	 But	 I	 will	 not	 pretend	 to	 articulate	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	
conditions	corresponding	to	the	operative	concept	of	sexual	orienta-
tion	—	nor	 do	 I	maintain	 that	 such	 conditions	 exist.	 The	 conditions	
corresponding	to	our	ascriptions	of	sexual	orientation	admit,	no	doubt,	
of	borderline	and	vague	cases.	My	primary	concern	is	to	capture	the	
core	elements	of	these	conditions	in	order	to	generally	preserve	the	
extension	of	our	everyday	concept	of	sexual	orientation.
And	 I	 do	 think	 that	 a	 number	 of	 things	 can	be	 said	 to	 elucidate	
the	 conditions	 under	 which	 we	 typically	 confer	 sexual	 orientation.	
In	particular,	 I	propose	the	 following	as	conditions	constraining	our	
ascriptions	of	 sexual	 orientation	—	that	 is,	 as	 conditions	 correspond-
ing	to	the	operative	concept	—	reminding	the	reader	to	think	of	these	
as	generalities	that	admit	of	exception	and	vagueness,	rather	than	as	
strict	rules	of	use.
(I)	 The	operative	concept	assumes	attraction	to	persons	of	a	
certain	 sex	 or	 gender	 (at	 least	 partially)	 because they	 are	
that	sex	and/or	gender.
For	example:	Say	that	Elijah	has	strong	sexual	druthers	for	persons	
with	long	hair,	but	has	no	preference	between	men	or	women	as	sexu-
al	partners.	Elijah	lives	in	a	town	where	the	only	people	with	long	hair	
happen	to	be	women.	As	a	result,	it	is	true	to	say	that	Elijah	is	attracted	
only	to	women.	But	because	he	is	not	attracted	to	them	because they	
are	women,	we	would	not	say	that	Elijah	has	the	sexual	orientation	
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Bidimensional Dispositionalism [BD]:	A	person	S’s	sex-
ual	orientation	is	grounded60	in	S’s	dispositions	to	engage	
in	sexual	behaviors	under	 the	ordinary	condition[s]	 for	
these	dispositions,61	and which	sexual	orientation	S	has	
is	grounded	in	what	sex[es]	and	gender[s]	of	persons	S	is	
disposed	to	sexually	engage	under	these	conditions.62, 63
In	 other	 words,	 I	 propose	 that	—	whatever	 the	 categories	 we	
place	 within	 ‘sexual	 orientation’	—	their	 ascription	 should	 be	 based	
on	the	sex[es]	and	gender[s]	of	the	persons	someone	is	disposed	to	
60.	I	use	 the	 term	 ‘grounded’	here	 in	 the	 loose	sense	of	 ‘dependent	on’	or	 ‘ex-
plained	by’.	One	may	also	be	able	to	understand	it	in	terms	of	‘built	on’,	which	
(roughly)	means	‘less	fundamental	than’	or	‘accounted	for	in	terms	of’.	(See	
Bennett	[forthcoming].)
61.	 I	 remain	 neutral	 on	 the	 debate	 over	whether	 properties	 can	 have	 disposi-
tional	essences	or	if	all	dispositions	reduce	to	categorical	properties.	For	my	
purposes	here,	I	don’t	have	a	dog	in	that	fight.
62.	As	Shamik	Dasgupta	pointed	out,	someone	might	be	concerned	that	BD,	as	
stated,	does	not	ensure	that	the	dispositions	relevant	to	sexual	orientation	
are	 particularly	 “deep”	 or	 “self-disclosing”.	 Sexual	 orientation,	 one	might	
think,	 deserves	protection	because it	 is	 deep	 and,	 in	 this	way,	 outside	 (or	
mostly	outside)	a	person’s	 control.	While	 I	acknowledge	 this	worry,	 I	dis-
agree	with	the	 idea	that	sexual	orientation	must	be	particularly	“deep”	to	
merit	special	protections.	Whether	or	not	sexual	orientation	has	these	fea-
tures	is	orthogonal	to	its	merit	for	protection.	Even	if	every	person	shifted	
sexual	 orientation	 every	week	 (and	 even	 if	we	 could	 do	 so	 by	 choice),	 I	
would	 insist	 that	 sexual	 orientation	 deserves	 protections.	 However,	 one	
might	worry	that,	even	apart	from	questions	of	protections,	sexual	orienta-
tion	is	a	“deep”	and	unchangeable	(or	nearly	unchangeable)	feature	of	who	
someone	 is.	 I	want	 to	 remain	neutral	on	 this	question,	and	so	 the	 formu-
lation	of	BD	allows	but	does	not	 require	someone’s	 sexual	orientation	 to	
undergo	frequent	shifts.
63.	By	 ‘sex[es]	 and	gender[s]	of	persons…’	 I	 do	not	mean	 to	 imply	 that	 there	
must	be	any	particular	persons	of	this	sex	and	gender,	or	particular	persons	
with	whom	S	is	disposed	to	sexually	engage.	That	is,	S	could	be	disposed	to	
engage	with	persons	who	are	cisgender	women	even	if	there	were	no	cisgen-
der	women,	or	even	if	there	were	no	particular	cisgender	women	with	whom	
S	is	disposed	to	engage.
abnormal	sexual	behavior	that	occurs	under	the	influence	of	alcohol	
or	narcotics	(and	therefore	is	nonconsensual)	to	be	an	unreliable	in-
dicator	of	sexual	orientation.
Again,	(I)–(III)	are	generalizations	of	the	conditions	that	I	think	are	
built	into	the	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	and	they	there-
fore	will	admit	of	occasional	exceptions	or	borderline	cases.	They	re-
main,	though,	useful	guidelines	explaining	why	we	consider	extreme	
circumstances	 poor	 guides	 to	 determining	 sexual	 orientation,	 and	
how	we	can	reliably	ascribe	sexual	orientation	to	persons	without	ap-
pealing	to	“ideal”	conditions.
Someone	may	here	object	that,	in	appealing	to	the	conditions	un-
derlying	our	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation	in	order	to	con-
struct	 a	 revised	 concept	 of	 sexual	 orientation,	 I	 appear	 to	 be	 doing	
mere	conceptual	analysis.	To	this,	 I	would	again	emphasize	that	my	
project	is	necessarily	in	part	descriptive	because	it	aims	to	generally	
preserve	 the	extension	of	our	 everyday	operative	 concept	of	 sexual	
orientation.	But	it	 is	prescriptive	insofar	as	I	am	out	to	precisify	and	
revise	this	concept	in	order	for	it	to	more	efficiently	and	ethically	serve	
the	purposes	assigned	to	it.	Noticeable	revisions	concern	decisively	in-
cluding	both	sex-	and	gender-attraction	as	criteria	for	ascribing	sexual	
orientation	and	—	as	we	will	now	see	—	distancing	 the	concept	 from	
concerning	 the	 relation	between	a	 subject’s	own	sex	or	gender	and	
the	sex	or	gender	of	the	persons	they	are	attracted	to.	These	revision-
ary	aims	are	importantly	distinct	from	projects	that	intend	to	radically	
revise	the	conditions	determining	concept	deployment.59
Bidimensional Dispositionalism
Putting	together	the	previous	discussions	of	gender/sex	and	behavior-
ism/dispositionalism,	we	arrive	at	my	positive	proposal:
59.	 See	Haslanger	(1995),	114.
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orientation	 should	 “reduce	 or	 eliminate	 the	 presumption	 that	 cish-
eterosexuality	is	the	normatively	standard	sexual	orientation	and	all	
queer	sexual	orientations	are	normatively	deviant”,	and	be	“conducive	
for	 establishing	 legal	 and	 social	protections	 for	non-cisheterosexual	
persons”.	The	categorization	shift	proposed	by	BD	moves	us	closer	to	
accomplishing	both	of	these	tasks.	
First,	BD	promotes	the	aims	of	purpose	(iii)	because	BD	eliminates 
the distinction between cisheterosexuality and queer sexual orientations and	
provides a taxonomic schema capable of recognizing persons outside the gen-
der or sex binary.	On	the	former	point,	on	BD,	there	are	no	such	sexual	
orientations	as	(e. g.)	“homosexual”	or	“heterosexual”.	And	there	is	no	
distinction	in	the	sexual	orientations	of	(e. g.)	a	cisgender	man	and	a	
transgender	woman	who	both	are	exclusively	attracted	to	women.	The	
statistical	divide	between	cisheterosexuality	and	queer	sexual	orienta-
tions	simply	disappears,	because	these	categories	disappear,	and	their	
members	are	reorganized	into	new	categories.	While	this	will	not	of	
itself	eliminate	discriminatory	attitudes,	it	does	change	the	concept	of	
sexual	orientation	such	that	it	does	not	simply	fall	out	of	the	concept	
that	cisheterosexuality	is	statistically	standard	and	all	else	is	deviant.	It	
also	removes	the	connotation	that	“sexual	orientation”	is	what	distin-
guishes	 (e. g.)	 the	so-called	 “straight”	and	 “queer”	communities.	 I	be-
lieve	that	this	is	a	socially	and	politically	beneficial	result,	encouraging	
dismantling	the	divide	between	these	communities.	
On	the	latter	point,	BD	does	not	build	in	either	discrete	or	binary	
gender	 or	 sex	 categories,	 and	 so	 has	 the	 flexibility	 to	 adopt	 a	 vari-
ety	of	sex	and	gender	taxonomies.	With	this	flexibility,	 it	 is	capable	
of	providing	taxonomic	recognition	for	persons	outside	of	the	sex	or	
gender	 binaries	 (e. g.,	 genderqueer	 or	 intersex	 persons),	 as	well	 as	
their	sexual	partners.
Second,	BD	achieves	(or	at	least	moves	toward	achieving)	purpose	
(iv)	by	providing	the	conceptual	tools	for	lawmakers	to	secure	protec-
tions	for	sexual	orientation	under	pre-existing	protections	against	gen-
der-	and	sex-discrimination.	That	is,	because	sexual	orientation	makes	
no	reference	to	one’s	own sex	and	gender	on	BD,	any	discrimination	
sexually	engage	with	under	ordinary	conditions	for	ascribing	sexual	
orientation.64
This	 analysis	 recasts	 sexual	orientation	as	pertaining	 to	bidimen-
sional	attraction	—	that	is,	as	pertaining	to	both	sex-	and gender-attrac-
tion.	But,	importantly,	BD	does	not	require	that,	in	order	to	be	ascribed	
a	 sexual	orientation,	 someone	must	have	a	 certain	 sex-attraction	or	
gender-attraction.	One	 could	be	neutral	 as	 to	one	or	both,	 or	be	 at-
tracted	to	neither	(i. e.,	be	asexual	with	regard	to	sex	and	gender).	All	
of	this	would	be	revealed	by	their	dispositions	to	engage	(which	could	
be	dispositions	to	never	engage)	in	sexual	behavior	with	certain	per-
sons	(at	least	partially)	on	the	basis	of	their	sex	and	gender.65 
By	 emphasizing	 only	 these	 dispositions,	 BD	 understands	 sexual	
orientation	solely in terms of the sex[es] and gender[s] of the persons one 
is disposed to sexually engage, without reference to the sex or gender of the 
person so disposed.	 Under	 this	 framework,	 for	 example,	 a	 cisgender	
man	and	transgender	woman	disposed	to	sexually	engage	only	with	
cisgender	women	have	the	same	sexual	orientation,	and	so	too	for	a	
cisgender	man	and	gender-nonconforming	female	disposed	to	engage	
only	with	men.	 In	emphasizing	this	shift	 in	our	categories	of	sexual	
orientation,	BD	rejects	the	idea	that	sexual	orientation	can	be	classi-
fied	in	terms	of	a	relation	between	persons	of	the	“same”	or	“opposite”	
sex	or	gender.	
This	 taxonomical	shift	 is	 important	 to	the	fulfillment	of	purposes	
(iii)–(iv).	Recall	that	these	purposes	stated	that	an	analysis	of	sexual	
64.	While	I	will	not	address	this	issue	here,	we	arguably	should	also	acknowledge	
that	these	dispositions	themselves	come	in	a	range	of	strengths,	which	would	
add	another	dimension	 to	sexual	orientation.	 (Thanks	 to	 Justin	Christy	 for	
this	suggestion.)	
65.	 I	expect	that	we	are	often	attracted	to	certain	persons	because	they	have	char-
acteristics	that	are	associated	with	particular	genders,	and	not	because	of	the	
totality	of	their	gender	expression.	For	my	purposes,	this	sort	of	connection	is	
sufficient	to	allow	for	the	explanatory	connection	between	gender	and	attrac-
tion,	though	it	leaves	many	open	questions	regarding	what	(if	anything)	is	es-
sential	to	particular	gender	expressions,	and	more	generally,	how	we	should	
think	about	the	constitution	of	gender	expressions.	I	leave	these	questions	to	
persons	working	in	the	metaphysics	of	gender.
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One	worry	about	BD	is	that	it	does	not	give	us	enough	epistemic	
access	to	our	own	sexual	orientations.	How	will	we	know	our	sexual	
orientation	if	it	would	require	being	placed	under	circumstances	that	
we	are	not	actually	in?	How	could,	say,	a	lifelong	celibate	priest	know 
that	they	would	take	certain	actions	if	they	were	under	these	“ordinary	
circumstances”?	It	might	seem	as	though	any	compelling	account	of	
sexual	 orientation	will	make	 it	 possible	 for	 someone	 to	 know	 their	
own	sexual	orientation,	and	BD	does	not	do	this.67
This	objection,	though,	makes	a	substantive	assumption:	that	the	
correct	metaphysical	analysis	of	sexual	orientation	must	bend	to	a	de-
mand	for	epistemological	 transparency	(or	something	close	to	trans-
parency).	 And	 I	 see	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 this.	 In	 fact,	 we	 have	 good	
reason	 to	 deny	 it,	 given	 the	many	 examples	 of	 repression	 and	 self-
deception	of	sexual	orientation	under	(e. g.)	social,	religious,	or	famil-
ial	expectations.68	And	this	does	not	mean	that	we	have	no	idea	what	
our	sexual	orientations	are	—	in	general,	people	seem	to	have	a	“good	
enough”	idea	of	their	sexual	attractions	and	how	they	do	or	would	act	
under	certain	circumstances	that	they	also	have	a	“good	enough”	idea	
of	their	sexual	orientation	to	seek	out	specific	(or	no)	sexual	partners.	
Insofar,	too,	as	we	think	that	persons	have	some	manner	of	epistemic	
privilege	in	self-assessments	of	desire,	attraction,	and	so	on	—	features	
that	inform	and	direct	their	behavioral	dispositions	—	we	can	maintain	
that	persons	also	have	some	manner	of	epistemic	privilege	in	self-as-
criptions	of	sexual	orientation.
Another	worry	for	BD	concerns	the	relation	between	sexual	dis-
positions	and	sexual	desires.	Why,	someone	might	ask,	should	we	go	
to	the	trouble	of	analyzing	sexual	orientation	in	terms	of	dispositions	
and	all	their	metaphysical	baggage,	when	we	can	much	more	simply	
analyze	it	in	terms	of	sexual	desire,	understood	as	an	occurrent	men-
tal	state?
67.	Thanks	to	Peter	Finocchiaro	for	raising	this	objection.
68.	Indeed,	the	testimony	of	many	queer	persons	suggests	that	discovery	of	one’s	
own	sexual	orientation	can	be	a	long	and	difficult	process.	
against	someone	in	response	to	their	sexual	orientation	can	be	re-de-
scribed	as	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	their	gender	or	sex.	
This	 conceptual	 shift	 is,	 in	 fact,	 ripe	 for	 public	 uptake.	 Supreme	
Court	Chief	Justice	John	Roberts	recently	articulated	a	similar	shift	in	
thought	during	oral	argument	in	Henry v. Hodges,	a	case	concerning	
the	legalization	of	same-sex	marriage.	Justice	Roberts	re-described	the	
same-sex	marriage	question	in	terms	of	sex	discrimination,	and	(per-
haps	 rhetorically)	asked	why	 the	 issue	could	not	be	decided	on	 the	
basis	of	pre-existing	protections	against	sex	discrimination:
I’m	not	sure	it’s	necessary	to	get	into	sexual	orientation	to	
resolve	this	case.…	I	mean,	if	Sue	loves	Joe	and	Tom	loves	
Joe,	Sue	can	marry	him	and	Tom	can’t.	And	the	difference	
is	based	on	their	different	sex.	Why	isn’t	that	a	straightfor-
ward	question	of	sexual	discrimination?66 
As	Justice	Roberts	here	notes,	cases	of	sexual	orientation	discrimi-
nation	can	be	easily	re-described	in	terms	of	gender	or	sex	discrimina-
tion	by	holding	fixed	that	multiple	individuals	share	the	same	sex-	or	
gender-attractions,	and	yet	some	are	discriminated	against	simply	be-
cause	they	have	a	particular	sex	or	gender	in	addition	to	those	attrac-
tions.	BD	goes	a	step	further	by	saying	that	the	sex-	and	gender-attrac-
tions	—	again,	understanding	these	attractions	in	terms	of	behavioral	
dispositions	under	ordinary	conditions	—	are	all	that	matter	for	sexual	
orientation.	My	own	sex	and	gender,	 for	example,	do	not	matter	for	
my	sexual	orientation.	And	so,	if	I	am	discriminated	against	for	having	
the	attractions	constituting	sexual	orientation	X	and	a	man	who	has	
sexual	orientation	X	is	not	discriminated	against,	I	can	recast	this	dis-
crimination	as	gender	discrimination	and	appeal	to	pre-existing	laws	
prohibiting	this	discrimination	as	the	basis	for	my	legal	protection.	
66.	Liptak	(2015).	This	argument	in	favor	of	legalizing	same-sex	marriage	on	the	
basis	of	pre-existing	laws	against	sex-discrimination	also	was	the	central	ar-
gument	of	an	amicus curiae	brief	filed	by	a	number	of	legal	scholars	in	Henry v. 
Hodges, Supreme	Court	Case	No.	14–556.
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desire	(and	the	corresponding	behavioral	dispositions)	would	not	be	
able	to	accommodate	this	case.	
If	instead	one	prefers,	for	example,	a	pleasure-based	theory	of	de-
sire,	then	the	formulation	will	be	too	narrow	to	capture	the	concept	of	
sexual	orientation.	Not	everyone	receives	pleasure	from	sexual	behav-
ior.	Still	other	theories	of	desire	(e. g.,	attention-based	or	holistic)	are	
too	broad	to	capture	the	concept.69	And	so	on,	I	would	argue,	for	the	
other	main	candidate	theories	of	desire.	Of	course,	one	could	simply	
appeal	to	a	“common	understanding”	of	desire,	but	I	am	skeptical	that	
there	is	any	such	thing.	
Third,	one	might	worry	 that	desires	are	 too	context-sensitive	 to	
capture	the	general	(though	perhaps	not	necessary)	stability	of	sex-
ual	orientation.	Earlier,	I	argued	that	we	should	not	use	Stein’s	“ideal	
conditions”	as	the	relevant	manifesting	conditions	for	sexual	behav-
ioral	dispositions,	because	we	have	good	reason	to	think	that	some-
one’s	desires	would	be	significantly	altered	in	a	scenario	with	wholly	
unrestricted	 access	 to	 a	 huge	 variety	 of	 sexual	 partners.	Whatever	
these	desires	(and	the	corresponding	behaviors)	are,	I	argued,	they	
are	not	reliable	indicators	of	someone’s	actual	sexual	orientation.	But,	
similarly,	I	think	there	are	cases	where	someone’s	actual	desires	are	
not	reliable	indicators	of	their	sexual	orientation.	For	example,	it	is	
reasonable	to	expect	that	someone	in	a	context	lacking	a	reasonable	
variety	of	potential	partners,	such	as	a	prison,	may	undergo	shifts	in	
sexual	desire.	And	yet	we	would,	I	think,	still	deny	that	these	shift-
ed	desires	are	reliable	indicators	of	their	sexual	orientation,	or	that	
these	shifts	in	desire	constitute	a	shift	in	their	sexual	orientation.	Per-
haps,	 to	avoid	this	result,	one	could	 insist	 that	 the	desires	relevant	
to	sexual	orientation	are	those	that	one	would have	in	the	ordinary	
conditions	 that	 I’ve	described.	But,	 in	 that	case,	we’ve	only	moved	
from	behavioral	to	psychological	dispositions;	we	haven’t	gotten	rid	
of	dispositions,	or	pinpointed	particular	mental	 states	determining	
sexual	orientation.	
69.	For	an	overview	of	these	(and	other)	theories	of	desire,	see	Schroeder	(2014).
The	first	and	most	 important	 response	 is,	 I	 think,	 to	emphasize	
that	 in	order	 to	achieve	 the	pragmatic	goals	discussed	earlier,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 avoid	 an	 account	 that	 wholly	 psychologizes	 sexual	
orientation.	While	I	 leave	open	that	the	behavioral	dispositions	for	
which	 persons	 need	 political	 and	 social	 protections	 have	 categori-
cal	 psychological	 bases,	 these	 bases	will	 not	 be	 the	 focus	 of	 a	 so-
cio-politically	oriented	account	of	sexual	orientation.	For	these	pur-
poses,	 someone	with	 the	psychological	 features	of	a	 “heterosexual”	
but	queer	behavioral	dispositions	can	and	should	be	protected	from	
anti-queer	 prejudice.	 In	 other	words,	 given	 the	pragmatic	 goals	 of	
my	account,	the	questions	of	whether	or	which	psychological	states	
ground	the	behavioral	dispositions	at	issue	are	interesting	questions	
for	neuroscientists,	but	not	ones	that	should	guide	a	politically	moti-
vated	account	of	sexual	orientation.
Second,	given	the	current	main	contending	theories	of	desire,	an	
account	in	terms	of	desire	either	amounts	to	a	problematically	restrict-
ed	dispositional	view	or	else	creates	new	(and	worse)	problems.	Sup-
pose,	for	example,	that	one	is	partial	to	an	action-based	theory	of	de-
sire,	articulated	in	terms	of	dispositions.	In	this	case,	sexual	desires	just	
are	the	categorical	basis	of	the	kinds	of	behavioral	dispositions	that	I	
have	been	talking	about.	At	first,	it	might	seem	like	this	view	would	be	
co-extensive	with	my	own,	but	preferable	because	it	is	articulated	in	
familiar	terms	(desire)	rather	than	in	the	technical	language	of	disposi-
tions.	This	thought	would	be	mistaken.	A	sexual-desire	view	of	sexual	
orientation	 would	 not	 be	 co-extensive	 with	 my	 own,	 because	 ordi-
nary	dispositionalism	allows	sexual	behavioral	dispositions	to	have	a	
range	of	categorical	psychological	bases	(or	no	categorical	basis),	and	
certainly	does	not	restrict	the	relevant	dispositions	to	ones	grounded	
in	the	mental	states	that	we	would	categorize	as	“sexual	desire”.	For	
example,	if	someone	is	attracted	to	women	on	the	basis	of,	say,	a	con-
stant	curiosity	about	what	it	is	like	to	have	sex	with	women,	but	not	
because	of	desire-like	attitudes	typically	considered	sexual	attraction,	
my	account	does	not	rule	out	that	this	person	can	be	classified	as	sexu-
ally	women-oriented.	A	view	of	sexual	orientation	restricted	to	sexual	
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Discrete/Continuous Categories
BD	requires	that	we	acknowledge	that	sexual	orientation	is	bidimen-
sional,	pertaining	to	both	sex-	and	gender-attraction.	Within	this	bidi-
mensionality,	though,	we	can	and	should	ask	whether	our	categories	
of	sexual	orientations	will	be	discrete	or	continuous.	The	most	com-
mon	 current	 categories	 of	 sexual	 orientation	 are	 uniformly	discrete.	
In	ordinary	discourse,	we	typically	hear	two,	or	at	best	three,	discrete	
categories:	 “heterosexual”,	 “bisexual”,	 and	 “homosexual”.	 Expanding	
our	concept	of	sexual	orientation	to	include	both	sex	and	gender	will	
increase	 the	number	of	 sexual	orientation	categories.	But	 it	will	not	
of	itself	revise	these	categories	such	that	they	are	no	longer	discrete,	
since	it	will	not	of	itself	revise	our	categories	of	sex	and	gender	to	no	
longer	be	discrete	(much	less	binary).
Suppose	 someone	 accepts,	 for	 example,	 a	 sex	 binary	 (male	 and	
female)	and	a	gender	binary	 (men/women).	 In	 that	 case,	under	BD,	
they	would	have	 four	 categories	 for	 attraction	qua	 sex	 and	 four	 for	
attraction	qua	gender,	arriving	at	sixteen	discrete	categories	of	sexual	
orientation.	Consider	the	following	example	of	how	one	might	retain	
discrete	categories	of	sexual	orientation	under	BD,	where	 ‘attraction’	
can	be	taken	as	a	useful	shorthand	signaling	dispositions	to	engage	in	
sexual	behavior:
Illustration 1: Discrete Categories
 
Sex-Attraction 
(Assumes	two	sexes	—	male/female)
Gender-Attraction 
(Assumes	two	genders	—	men/women)
A:	Not	attracted	to	either	sex	qua	sex 1:	 Not	 attracted	 to	 either	 gender	 qua	
gender
B:	Attracted	to	males 2:	Attracted	to	men
C:	Attracted	to	females 3:	Attracted	to	women
D:	Attracted	to	males	and	females 4:	Attracted	to	men	and	women
My	 respondent	 might	 be	 fine	 with	 accounting	 for	 sexual	 orien-
tation	 in	 terms	 of	 dispositions	 to	 desire	 rather	 than	 dispositions	 to	
behavior,	 strange	 as	 it	may	 seem.	But	 framing	 sexual	orientation	 in	
this	way	would	not	avoid	yet	another	problem	for	any	desire-based	
account:	 dispositions	 to	 desire	would	 underdetermine	 sexual	 orien-
tation	 because	 desire	 underdetermines	 sexual	 orientation.	 Consider	
someone	who	 is	 behaviorally	 disposed	 to	 sexually	 engage	with	 cer-
tain	persons,	but	does	not	possess	the	emotional	or	cognitive	features	
of	sexual	desire.	(Again,	we	could	imagine	that	they	are	motivated	to	
sexually	engage	with	persons	on	the	basis	of	curiosity,	free	of	desire.)	
That	 is,	 they	 don’t	 (e. g.)	 feel	 sexual	 yearnings,	 spend	 time	 thinking	
about	sexual	behavior	or	 receive	particular	pleasure	 from	sexual	be-
havior.	Does	this	person	have	a	sexual	orientation?	It	seems	to	me	that	
they	do,	suggesting	that	desires	are	not	necessary for	sexual	orientation. 
But	are	they	sufficient?	Consider	too	the	unlikely	but	 imaginable	
case	of	someone	who	feels	desire	for,	say,	cisgender	men,	but	 is	dis-
posed	only	 to	sexually	engage	with	women.	 In	 this	case,	and	partic-
ularly	 for	 the	 socio-politically	motivations	discussed	above,	 I	would	
argue	that	this	person’s	sexual	orientation	is	one	of	orientation	toward	
women	and	not	cisgender	men.	But	I	admit	that	intuitions	about	our	
concept’s	extension	may	get	fuzzy	with	regard	to	both	of	these	hypo-
theticals	—	I	can	only	report	my	own.	I	suspect	that	one’s	response	may	
come	down	to	whether	one	 tends	 to	 think	about	sexual	orientation	
as	 something	predominately	 action-oriented	or	predominately	 inter-
nal.	But	more	importantly	(given	that	this	is	an	engineering	project),	I	
support	the	former	view	as	better	equipped	to	achieve	the	social	and	
political	purposes	behind	the	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	and	as	not	
clearly	in	conflict	with	the	general	extension	of	our	everyday	concept.
Even	with	 this	advantage,	BD	 is	only	 the	beginning	of	a	 full	ana-
lytic	account	of	sexual	orientation.	It	remains	neutral	on	a	number	of	
important	and	closely	related	philosophical	questions.	I	turn	now	to	
these	questions,	which	will	highlight	where	 further	 research	can	ex-
pand	philosophical	discussion	of	sexual	orientation.
	 robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation?
philosophers’	imprint	 –		23		– vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016)
Sex-Attraction 
(Assumes	two	sexes	—	male/female)
1:	Not	attracted	to	either	sex	qua	sex
2:	Attracted	to	males
3:	Attracted	to	females
4:	Attracted	to	males	and	females
 
Under	 this	 view,	 a	 category	 within	 sexual	 orientation	 might	 be	
“MA-1”,	heuristically	referring	to	someone	who	—	under	ordinary	con-
ditions	—	is	disposed	to	engage	in	sexual	behaviors	with	persons	who	
present	as	(roughly)	androgynous	or	masculine,	regardless	of	their	sex.	
BD	remains	neutral	on	the	issue	of	discrete	vs.	continuous	catego-
ries	of	sexual	orientation.	But	the	questions	surrounding	the	issue	re-
quire	much	closer	attention,	and	my	hope	is	that	further	research	on	
sex	and	gender	will	 allow	an	expansion	of	BD	 that	 specifies	 sexual	
orientation	as	continuous.	It	would	thereby	become	more	equipped	to	
recognize	sexual	diversity	and	fulfill	the	need	for	an	account	of	sexual	
orientation	that	eliminates	the	idea	that	cisheterosexuality	is	the	“stan-
dard”	sexual	orientation	and	all	else	is	“deviant”.	
Essentialism/Constructionism
As	stated,	BD	is	also	neutral	on	the	question	of	essentialism	vs.	con-
structionism	 about	 sexual	 orientation.	 Roughly,	 essentialism	 is	 the	
view	that	sexual	orientation	is	something	necessary	or	unifying	about	
humans	as	a	kind	or	as	particular	humans	(thereby	applying	cross-cul-
turally),	whereas	constructionism	is	the	view	that	sexual	orientation	
is	socially	constructed	(thereby	culturally	specific),	and	may	not	(de-
pending	on	the	type	of	construction)	in	any	sense	“carve	at	the	joints”	
of	reality.71
71.	 See	Haslanger	(1995)	for	a	wonderful	look	at	how	different	levels	and	kinds	
of	social	constructions	correspond	to	what	we	admit	into	our	ontology.
Under	 a	 view	 such	 as	 this,	 a	 category	 within	 sexual	 orientation	
might	 be	 “C2”,	which	 refers	 to	 someone	who	—	under	 ordinary	 con-
ditions	—	is	 disposed	 to	 engage	 in	 sexual	 behaviors	 only	with	 trans-
gender	men	who	have	not	had	genital	surgery.	One	could	also	easily	
add	‘intersex’	to	the	left-hand	column,	‘genderqueer’	to	the	right-hand	
column,	and	so	on.	The	element	I	mean	to	emphasize	in	such	a	view	
is	 the	 insistence	upon	discrete	categories	 for	sex	and	gender,	which	
leads	to	discrete	categories	of	sexual	orientation.
If	instead	(as	I	prefer)	one	understands	gender	(and	perhaps	sex)	
to	 refer	 to	 a	 continuous	 spectrum,	 then	 sexual	 orientation	will	 also	
refer	to	a	continuous	spectrum.	Of	course,	within	ordinary	discourse,	
we	 typically	have	heuristic	markers	along	continuous	spectrums	 for	
pragmatic	purposes	(e. g.,	‘tall’	or	‘hot’).70	But	it	is	generally	understood	
that	 these	markers	 are	merely	 heuristic,	 and	 do	 not	 refer	 to	 neatly	
closed	categories.	This	could	easily	be	applied	within	discourse	about	
sexual	orientations.	The	following	illustrate	a	view	under	which	sex	
categories	are	discrete	but	gender	categories	are	continuous,	resulting	
in	continuous	categories	of	sexual	orientation:
Illustration 2: Continuous Categories
Gender-Attraction	[Attraction	may	be	represented	at	one,	no,	or	mul-
tiple	locations	on	the	diagram]:
70.	In	other	words,	 I	prefer	an	account	 that	 rejects	epistemicism	about	gender	
categories,	just	as	most	of	us,	I	think,	would	reject	epistemicism	about	‘tall’	or	
‘hot’.
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framework	related	to	sexual	orientation	are	socially	constructed,	but	
they	refer	to	real	properties	(or	traits,	if	you	prefer)	of	individuals	that	
are	in	part	socially	formed	and	in	part	biologically	determined.75 
Moderate	constructionism’s	main	benefit	 is	allowing	 the	possibil-
ity	of	cross-cultural	behaviors	and	biological	traits	loosely	translating	
onto	a	contemporary	framework	—	namely,	the	framework	of	the	“or-
dinary	conditions	 for	ascribing	sexual	orientation”	—	while	maintain-
ing	that	the	contemporary	understanding	of	sexual	orientation	should	
not	be	applied	 to	 cultures	 lacking	 the	concept	of	 sexual	orientation	
within that culture.	 But	 I	 also	 worry	 that	 moderate	 constructionism	
gives	too	prominent	of	a	place	to	biology,	and	underestimates	the	de-
gree	 to	which	sexual	orientation	 is	socially	constructed.	 In	any	case,	
I	currently	have	only	tentative	opinions	about	these	issues,	and	so	I	
have	chosen	to	here	state	BD	as	neutral	on	issues	of	essentialism	and	
constructionism.76
4. Conclusion and Implications
Although	 I’ve	gone	 to	 lengths	 to	 clarify	what	 issues	 I	 do	not	 take	 a	
firm	position	 on,	 I	 do	 not	mean	 to	 leave	 the	 impression	 that	 BD	 is	
an	uncontroversial	thesis.	To	clarify	this,	I	will	briefly	state	its	central	
implications.	
First,	 to	 adopt	 BD	 is	 to	 reject	 our	 current	 taxonomy	 of	 sexual	
orientation.	 The	 assumptions	 that	 sexual	 orientation	 is	 always	 one-
dimensional	—	concerning	 either	 sex-attraction	 or	 gender-attraction,	
75.	 I	 predict	 that	whether	 you	 consider	 this	 a	 realist	 or	 fictionalist	 account	 of	
sexual	orientation	will	largely	depend	on	whether	you	are	a	realist	or	fiction-
alist	 about	 certain	 social	 kinds.	Within	 the	 distinction	 of	 idea-	 and	 object-
construction,	 this	 view	would	 incorporate	 elements	 of	 each.	While	 sexual	
orientation	classifications	would	be	considered	idea-constructions,	the	way	
that	we	are	socially	and	politically	impacted	by	these	classifications	(whether	
our	 self-identity	 aligns	 with	 our	 sexual	 orientation	 or	 not)	 incorporates	 a	
large	dose	of	object-construction	into	our	understanding	of	persons	as	sexu-
ally	oriented	beings.	(For	more	on	this	 issue,	see	Haslanger	&	Sveinsdóttir	
[2011].)	 I	 am	partial	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 is	a	balance	between	 these	con-
structions	and	biological	influence	in	determining	sexual	orientation.
76.	For	an	interesting	perspective	on	the	need	for	recognizing	individuals’	agen-
cy	in	determining	their	sexual	orientations,	see	Behrensen	(2013).
One	common	form	of	essentialism	is	biological	essentialism	—	of-
ten	heard	in	the	sentiment	“Born	This	Way”	—	which	claims	that	sexual	
orientation	 is	a	biologically	determined	 feature	of	a	person.72	While	
BD	is	compatible	with	this	view,	to	hold	both,	one	must	hold	to	biolog-
ical	determination	of	gender-attraction.	That	is,	if	sexual	orientation	is	
to	be	genetically	determined	and pertain	to	gender-attraction,	biologi-
cal	 essentialism	 faces	 the	 difficult	 challenge	 of	 explaining	how	gen-
der	could	be	(at	 least	partially)	socially	constructed,	and	yet	gender-
attraction	be	biologically	determined.73	For	this	reason,	it	seems	that	
BD	—	though	compatible	with	biological	essentialism	—	is	unlikely	to	
be	paired	with	it.	
I	do	not	have	space	here	to	discuss	alternative	forms	of	essential-
ism	about	sexual	orientation,	other	than	to	say	that	I	think	it	will	be	
difficult	to	find	a	form	of	essentialism	that	agrees	with	contemporary	
theories	of	gender,	which	almost	always	incorporate	some	degree	of	
constructionism.74	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 tentatively	 lean	 toward	 a	mod-
erately	 constructionist	 view	 according	 to	 which	 our	 social	 context	
(which	may	be	self-selected	to	some	extent)	directs	the	manifestation	
of	and	categories	for	the	manifestation	of	biological	tendencies	toward	
certain	sexual	attractions.	On	this	view,	the	concepts	and	interpretive	
72.	 See,	for	example,	LeVay’s	(2011)	analysis	of	sexual	orientation	as	“the trait that 
predisposes us	 to	 experience	 sexual	 attraction	 to	people	of	 the	 same	 sex	 as	
ourselves	(homosexual,	gay,	or	lesbian),	to	persons	of	the	other	sex	(hetero-
sexual	or	straight),	or	to	both	sexes	(bisexual)”	(emphasis	added).	By	identify-
ing	sexual	orientation	with	the	(according	to	him,	biological)	trait	that	predis-
poses	us	to	have	certain	attractions,	LeVay	adopts	a	biological	essentialism	
about	sexual	orientation.
73.	Of	course,	one	could	also	insist	(against	the	prevalent	view)	that	gender	is	
biologically	determined.
74.	One	 interesting	 line	 of	 inquiry	 would	 be	 whether	 Charlotte	Witt’s	 “unies-
sentialist”	account	of	gender,	which	combines	both	individual	essentialism	
and	social	construction,	could	be	applied	to	sexual	orientation.	On	this	view,	
certain	properties	of	someone,	such	as	their	gender,	can	be	essential	to	that	
person	as	a	social	individual,	which	Witt	views	as	one	of	the	three	parts	in	the	
trinitarian	ontology	of	“selves”	(i. e.,	human	organism,	person,	social	individ-
ual).	If	one	is	willing	to	adopt	Witt’s	ontology	of	“selves”,	perhaps	a	case	could	
be	made	for	sexual	orientation	as	an	essential	property	of	a	social	individual.
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implications	of	our	answers	—	remain	unexplored.	BD	only	begins	to	
map	this	promising	philosophical	landscape.77 
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